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"*Ut Ecclesia ædificationem accipiat.*"
I. Cor. xiv. 5.

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AMERICAN ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW.

VOL. VIII.—JANUARY, 1893.—NO. 1.

LEO XIII AND THE SAFEGUARDS OF REPUBLICS.

La Questione Francese e il Dovere Cattolico. Commentario dell' Enciclica di S. S. Leone XIII a' Francesi, di Salvatore M. Brandi, S.J.: gia pubblicato nella Civiltà ecc..: 1892; pagg. viii, 171.

THIS book of Father Brandi's on the Pope's settlement of an important political question is invested with the three-fold interest of being, in the first place and chiefly, religious, and, in a subordinate degree, political and personal. The personal interest attaches to it from the pathetic circumstance that the words of the short preface were the last ever penned by the aged philosopher, Father Liberatore, who was called away to his reward on October 18, in the eighty-second year of his age, and in the forty-second of the existence of that great Review which he had helped to found. Fathers Taparelli, Bresciani, and Curci, his three colleagues in the enterprise of establishing the *Civiltà Cattolica*, had passed away at earlier dates. Several generations of vigorous writers had come and gone. The staff had long been four-fold what it was on commencing. And the patriarch himself, after contributing an article on the Studies in Seminaries for the 1,016th number of the Review, which appeared in the middle of October, penned these lines, his last, for one of the youngest and newest members of the staff.

The degree of religious and political interest which invests this book may be gathered from the manner in which the gravest representatives of the press, both in Italy and France, have occupied themselves with it. Almost immediately the *Univers* began a formal translation of it; the *Figaro*, the *Gazette de France* and others have been full of it; and a curious discussion began to revolve about the identity of the author. The *Kölnische Volkszeitung*, copied by the *Univers* and the *Moniteur*, spoke of Fr. Clement Brandis, S.J., well known for his connections with the Austrian nobility, and supposed to be on the staff of the *Stimmen aus Maria Laach*; the *Lega-Lombarda* talked of Fr. Brandy (*sic*), an American, etc.; the *Cittadino*, of Genoa, pronounced for Fr. S. Brandi, an Italian of American origin; the *Italie* for Fr. Brando; the *Osservatore Cattolico* for the right gentleman, a Neapolitan by birth, late professor of Woodstock, etc. While this case of mistaken identity was agitating the press with commendable solicitude, the Jesuits of Paris and the Editorial College of the *Civiltà* in Rome were besieged with reporters, anxious, in the best reportorial fashion, to get a glance at the author of the book before us.

I.

On the 16th of February, 1892, the Holy Father wrote an encyclical letter to the clergy and to all the faithful of France; on the 3d of May he addressed a letter to the French Cardinals; and, on the 22d of June, he had occasion to answer the Bishop of Grenoble, and through him the Congress of Catholic Young Men, recently held in his episcopal city. These documents, which are printed together in the appendix to Father Brandi's book, contain the full expression of the Holy Father's policy, when he enjoins upon the French Catholics the acceptance of the Republican government. Abstracting entirely from the question of fundamental right, as to who is entitled to hold the reins of the government of France, he dwells wholly upon the question of fact, that the reins of power are actually in possession of a party, who are using them with fatal results to religion, morality and the

general good of society. Desiring the Catholic body to pursue no line of action, even legal in its nature, which will only continue to paralyze their powers, while aiming at the overthrow of the government, his Holiness exhorts all the French Catholic parties, and he orders them, to amass their divided strength, and help to rectify by constitutional means this irreligious legislation, which is being passed under constitutional forms.

In fact, while religion has been radically assailed by the government, all its appeals for defence have been utterly lost on its friends. They have been too busy with disputations about the monarchical succession. The house has been burning down; but they have been canvassing the merits of their respective apartments and lobbies. The curative which His Holiness has applied we might strongly be tempted to call a little common sense. However, in their embarrassed circumstances, we may allow it to rank as a remedy of self-forgetfulness and self-sacrifice.

The Holy Father said in his encyclical: The object of social life and of legislative action is the well-being of society. That is impossible without morality; and morality rests upon religion. Religion is the first basis of all society, domestic, social and political. Now, there is in full progress a systematic destruction of all religion and morality. The family is being destroyed by legislation on civil divorce; the future generation of citizens by infidel and godless education of the young; the clergy by enforced military service; the religious orders by exile or legalized confiscation. It is a duty incumbent on all to set about reforming the abuses of power; and in such a campaign, on such principles, there is every reason to expect support from all fair-minded citizens, who mean well. The policy to compass this must begin with a recognition of the actual Republic, which certainly is the depository, at the present moment, of social authority. For social authority is a necessity; and, wherever a society exists in fact, there is in fact that power which comes from God. But such recognition of the power existing in some subject *de facto* does no prejudice to the rights of any one else who may be the subject *de jure*.

This administrative action of the Holy Father, though the matter clearly involved religion and morality, was very distasteful to some leaders of the monarchical party. Heroic characters like the Count de Mun obeyed at once. But the Count de Paris, who is the legitimate heir to the throne, the Count de Haussonville, his lieutenant, the Count de Barreme, quickly signified their resentment at this intrusion, as they were pleased to consider it, of the priesthood into political affairs. At once, the old distinctions and subtleties, which have been of use in similar conjunctures, and will probably recur in the same service to the end of time, were put in requisition, about the two planes, one spiritual and the other temporal – infallibility where they choose to place it, and not even obedience where they do not want to practice it.

But, as Father Brandi notes[1] if the reason for practicing obedience in the order of the sacred ministry, and in the civil and domestic order of things were infallibility, what would remain of any human order whatever in the world? Parents are not infallible. Political authorities are not infallible. Priests and bishops are not infallible. What remains but rebellion and perpetual anarchy in the world? This question of a Catholic's duty, not only, in the matter of serving truth by the acceptance of doctrinal definitions, but also in the conduct of life by obedience to religious and moral authority, merits the full and admirable exposition which the author gives to it in the last chapter of this book.[2] We advert with pleasure to the fact that the substance of the said chapter is identical with the teaching of an article from the same writer's pen, in a former number of the AMERICAN ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW, under the title of "The Touchstone of Catholicity."[3] The article deserves renewed perusal. Its application is as important for the citizens of the United States as for the citizens of the French Republic. So much for the circumstances in which the encyclical was published. We now approach a couple of

1 Articolo Quarto, Difficoltà e risposte, p. 86.
2 Articolo Quinto, Il Dovere Cattolico.
3 February, 1892, pp. 89-97.

doctrinal or practical points, that concern our ways of thinking and acting in a Republic somewhat different from the French.

II.

There must be a relation of some kind or other always subsisting between the Catholic Church and political governments. Thence arises a certain duty for the Catholic subjects or citizens, under the rule of each government. In the Pope's teaching there is not wanting an allusion to the United States. And the judicious commentary by Father Brandi, who has been long habituated to the privileges of American citizenship, draws out the doctrine to our satisfaction.

We have often heard it said, and that not by Protestants alone, that a separation of Church from State, or, as the phrase goes, "A Free Church in a Free State," is the only policy which is rational; that it deserves application both where it is in use and where it is not. And, by an extension to the past ages of Christendom, we are given to understand that the opposite policy of union between Church and State was an error fruitful in evil consequences to both State and Church. We are not concerned with the arguments with which a conservative, such as Mr. Gladstone was once, did battle in behalf of union, or with which Lord Macaulay did battle against Mr. Gladstone. It is the maintenance of such a theory by Catholics which interests us now, and which receives its due appreciation from the utterance of the Roman Pontiff.

No doubt such a theory put forward by members of the Church admits of an excuse, and perhaps of more than one. The first explanation that occurs is the influence of the environment in which men live and breathe. Under the irradiations of a daily and monthly press, which is neither theological nor philosophical nor anything in particular, it will not be surprising if the opinions of men so formed, claim no strict kindred with any of the sciences which figure so slightly in their formation. Another explanation is to be

found in the fashion of cultivating a general ignorance on all matters of general history, prior to the date, say, when Franklin flew his kite, or Stevenson laid the first rails, or when a mob stormed the Bastile and set up a paper constitution, or, as the remotest date possible, when Luther purified the Papacy, and nurtured in his bosom that good Protestant gospel, the art of printing! Simplicity like this in matters of history is found outside of Protestantism. Now, constitutions are very good, especially when not of paper; and the useful arts too are good, and printing also. But so is sound historical information. And all that we wish to say at present about these good things is that we should like to see them all rescued from the durance vile of non-Catholic kidnappers; and, if that cannot be had from the packed jury of modern literature, at least to see Catholics restrained from abetting and countenancing the fashion of expropriating, when that is convenient, or of misrepresenting or ignoring, when nothing else will do.

History is eloquent on the subject of Church and State. Its account is so distinct as to have been made the object of the most concentrated ignorance. Without the past union of the Christian Church and State, we should be a little worse off to-day than even those who hate to know history; for we should never have had a Christendom to write history about. That union has meant the concord which exists, and in the plan of divine Providence is meant to exist, between the secular power wielding one sword, and the divine power of the Vicar of Christ wielding the other, a spiritual sword. "Lord," said the Apostles, "behold, here are two swords. And He said to them: It is enough." That union means the harmony between soul and body in the composite nature of human society, which, deriving its spiritual sustenance from Christ in His Church, calls for a peaceable exercise of its rights, "that we may live a quiet and peaceable life in all piety and chastity."[1] It is owing to this same concord that the prophecy has been fulfilled: "He shall rule from sea to sea, and from the river unto the ends of the earth.

1 I. Tim. ii. 2.

And all the kings of the earth shall adore Him; all nations shall serve Him."[1] For Christendom, that great monument of Christian polity, bearing witness as it does to the sovereignty of Christ, by its jurisprudence and its wholesome institutions, by its countless works of beneficence and enlightenment, testifies at the same time to its own origin, which was in great part due to the possession of both spiritual and temporal powers by the Prelates of the Church, and in great part due to the docility of Christian rulers in following the Church's counsels. This is so evident that, under the policy of separation, our highest ambition can reach no farther than that we be left alone, and be not trampled on as Catholics. No, God is the source of order, and therefore of subordination; and, if every soul is to be subject to the powers above it, so is the lower power to be subject to the higher, since "the powers, that are, are ordained of God."[2]

"We do not wish," says the Holy Father in his encyclical, "to stop and show all the absurdity there is in this theory of separation; every one will understand it for himself." Then, after briefly showing that the voice of reason proclaims the same truth, he continues: "Therefore let Catholics be most carefully on their guard against maintaining the theory of such separation. In fact, to wish that the State be separated from the Church would be to desire as a consequence that the Church be reduced to the liberty of living according to the common right of all citizens." But then he shows that this bare common right of citizenship, which entails no privilege of special recognition, is subject to one reservation—that the State will condescend to recognize the Church when it wants to persecute her.

Leaving this general doctrine intact, it may be urged that union with the State cannot be any longer favorable to the Church. Italy and France are specimens now; and, it may be added, the whole course of the Middle Ages afforded specimens in the past.

Parenthetically we may remark, it looks very odd for the Vicar of Christ to be saying one thing, in the province of

1 Ps. lxxi. 8. 2 Rom. xiii. 1.

his official functions, and for other people who speak vicariously for no body and no science that is known, to be telling us the contrary. As to France, the encyclical is written for the express purpose of maintaining religion there by a continued union of Church and State. Contrasting that country with other nations where the principle of separation holds, he says: "In France, a nation which is Catholic by its traditions and the present faith of the great majority of its children, the Church ought not to be placed in the precarious condition which it is subject to among other peoples." Of Italy he says, in his subsequent letter to the French Cardinals, that his policy there is identical with that which he has urged upon the French: "It is these identical religious interests which require us in Italy to demand unceasingly that full liberty, which is necessitated by our exalted ministry of Visible Head of the Catholic Church;" and therefore he cannot resign the freedom of the Church, by resigning the temporal power, consenting to separate Church from State, and sinking to the level of a State chaplain. Or, if any one merely cites the example of Italy as a nation, to show the inopportuneness in our days of union between Church and State, all that we can do is to open our eyes in astonishment, that any man who has his eyes open to visible facts, can prefer the debased condition of Italy, under these thirty years of revolution, to any other condition whatsoever, actual or possible under the sun.

As to the Middle Ages, our space utterly precludes entering upon them. Nor does our predilection lead us that way, to find out imaginary connections between mediæval terms. We will only say that, if all the evils which ever afflicted the Church must be due to the union of Church and State, then let it first be granted that all the good, likewise, which was effected—the prosperity, peace and civilization which made the Christendom whereof we are heirs—was due to that same union, concord and harmony betwixt the two powers, both of God. And if in these times, which are not conspicuous for their Christian faith nor for any prosperity, peace or civilization of their own, outside of a wild

and stupendous growth of material comforts and goods, the Holy Father reaffirms his own teaching on the Union of Church and State, reaffirms the teaching of Gregory XVI and the condemnation which Pius IX passed on the contrary doctrine of "A Free Church in a Free State,"[1] we may well apply the argument *a fortiori* to the Ages of Faith gone before. Nor will we admit that the evils of simony, ambition, clerical worldliness and all the troubles of "investitures" were due to that union which Christ intended. They were the gratuitous contributions of human free wills, which can abuse even the best things, and have done so always, and are at the same occupation still. That which is good remains good in spite of abuse. Even that which is necessary can be abused, yet it still remains necessary. This is the argument which the Holy Father uses, in the same encyclical, with respect to the legislative power of governments and the bad legislation which an infidel government can pass. He says: The legislative power is a "social necessity," and must be respected; but the bad laws are an abuse of that power, and are to be corrected.

Coming down now from the general truth that an organic and mutual understanding between Church and State was good and necessary; that it is good; that the absence of it is merely to be submitted to as a necessary evil, let us go on to draw out the doctrine of the Pope on two practical points. One is that state of things, about the worst conceivable, when the Church is subjected to Masonic legislation, as now in France. The other is that of the Church being without right or title in the world, enjoying indeed an immunity from the abuse of right or title, simply because she has neither, and leading that separate existence which is not her good by necessity, nor her good by choice; for it is not by nature a good at all. This is the condition of Catholicity in the United States.

III.

In the state of separation, or of a Free Church in a Free State, the same liberty is allowed to the religion of Christ as

1 Syllabus, Proposition LV. Brandi, Articolo 3.

to any citizen or organization of citizens that may be found in the country. The dignity of being a child of God, a member in vital union with Christ by the Sacraments, is classed with membership in any society or corporation, whether of sectarian and false religions, or of commercial nature, or of the most reprehensible and illicit principles. "This situation," says the Holy Father in the present encyclical, "is a manner of existence, which, if it is subject to many and grave inconveniences, offers also some advantages, especially when the legislative power, by a happy inconsistency, does not omit to let itself be guided by Christian principles; and these advantages, though they cannot justify the false principle of separation, nor authorize any one to defend it, does yet merit toleration (*rendent cependant digne de tolèrance*) for a state of things, which practically is not the worst it might be."

Whether the form of government be one kind or another, does not alter the merits of the question. "Every form of government," says the Holy Father, "is good, if only it knows how to proceed straight to its end, that is, the common good for which social authority is instituted." He says further: "From a relative point of view, one or other form of government can be preferable, according as it is the one better adapted to the character and customs of such and such a nation." This adaptation will have been determined "by the sum of circumstances, historical or national, but always of incidental human origin, which have created in a nation its traditional and even its fundamental laws; and by means of these, such and such a given form of government is realized, with some special method of transmitting the supreme powers."

Let us suppose now that a certain republic is animated by an unchristian, and even an anti-christian spirit, so as to pass laws most injurious to religion. Let us even suppose it true, what the French royalists have urged against the French Republic, that it is the "incarnation of impiety." What follows? The Pope answers: "This view of the case is what has given rise to dissensions, and has aggravated them. But

such angry discussions would have been avoided, if accurate account had been taken of that most obvious distinction between *constituted powers* and *legislation.* Legislation differs so far from the political powers and their form, that, under a government the most excellent in form, the legislation can be detestable, while, on the other hand, under a government the most imperfect in form, one can meet with excellent legislation." Now, "legislation is the work of the men who are invested with the power, and who, as a matter of fact, are governing the nation. Whence it results that, in practice, the quality of the laws depends more on the quality of the men than on the quality of the form of government. These laws, then, will be good or bad, according as the legislators have their minds imbued with good or bad principles, and allow themselves to be guided either by political wisdom or by passion." "Behold here," continues the Pontiff, "the precise ground on which, apart from political dissensions, good citizens should unite as one man to combat, by all legal and honest means, such progressive abuses of legislation."

This doctrine, as every one can see, comes right home to us. To complete it, let us consult the fundamental principles of all political institutions, whereon the Holy Father rests these self-evident conclusions. He says, near the beginning of the encyclical: "Let us take for our point of departure a truth most plain, admitted by all men of good sense, and loudly proclaimed by the history of all nations, that it is religion, and religion alone, which can create the social bond; that it alone suffices to maintain on a solid basis the peace of a nation." For the scope which men set before themselves in the social state "is not merely to provide for their temporal welfare, but, most of all to attain thereby the good of their moral well-being. Otherwise, society would be but little raised above any aggregation of creatures without reason, whose life consists entirely in the satisfaction of the sensual instincts. . . . . Now, morality supposes God, and, with God, religion. . . . . Since, then, religion is the expression, internal and external, of that dependence which, in justice, we owe to God, a grave consequence arises: All citi-

zens are bound to unite in maintaining the true religious sentiment in the nation, and, if need be, to defend it, should any school of atheism, in the face of nature and of history protesting against them, endeavor to cast God forth from society, assured thereby of extinguishing the moral sense in the depths of the human conscience."

In the United States, with the qualifications for self-government which characterize a people born and bred in the traditions of self-government, we are not subject to those excesses, which a little possession of the supreme power begets in other temperaments that are not to the manner born. With the even temper, the fund of practical sense, the enduring patience which begets mutual deference and a ready self-accommodation to circumstance—with these moral conditions around, such political means as a constitution, representative assemblies, legislative bodies produce results very different from the wild vagaries of an upstart class, distinguished by its arrogant restlessness in a nation remarkable for many brilliant and estimable gifts, but not for the moderation and calmness of a colder and more calculating race. Still, even in such conditions as we enjoy, though the ingrained spirit of moderation, or the absorption of mind in the interests of material prosperity, or, as the Holy Father gently expresses it, through a "happy inconsistency in the legislator," do avert the immediate irruption of destructive forces, there is no absolute security, as facts clearly show, against the action and extension "of that vast conspiracy," which, as the Pontiff bears witness, aims in France at annihilating Christianity; and still less security is there against the effects of that animosity, with which a certain class aims at "trampling under foot the most elementary notions of liberty, and of justice for the sentiments" of a large portion of the nation.

The Masonic programme adopted last September in the meeting held at Paris, laid it down, as the policy to be pursued with a Catholic nation, that "the emblems of worship should disappear from the tribunals, from the public high-roads, that the State should not procure at its expense

either local pastors, or chaplains, or ministers of any form of worship, whether in its ships, or in the precincts of its lyceums. In short, it was necessary that the laicization, already effected in the whole field of education, should be gradually extended to all the great public offices, and that an absolute neutrality, should be attained."[1] *Atheocracy* is the new watchword. And, in perfect conformity with the principle of eliminating the divine from humanity, there is inflicted on the nation the public presentation of the brutal and the foul, under every seductive form, to capture the human soul. Journals and periodicals, placards and plays, the fine arts themselves, all worked into a form of vileness which baffles and at the same time repels description, all are part of the same programme to corrupt and annihilate the moral sentiment. And, lest Catholics by accepting the Republic, in obedience to the Pope, might take it on themselves to purify the State, an orator proclaimed on the occasion, that "when all call themselves Republicans, it is natural that there be formed a party in favor of the *Republican Republic*, that is to say, the Masonic Republic (we should say, the know-nothing, or American Protective Republic), whose watchword is pronounced anti-clericalism, and lay socialism with all its liberties," or, as Fr. Brandi animadverts on these words "an atheistic socialism, with all the license of libertinism."[2]

When such junctures occur, one is tempted to recall that phrase of Macauley's, about "gangs of foreign banditti calling themselves patriots." Such a crisis is not in the immediate prospect, before this nation as a whole. Whether it is likely to approach, is a question depending very much upon one's manner of reading signs, and his gift of interpretation. Some would read signs in the discrimination practiced against Catholic institutions of education, as recently in Detroit and Toledo, or against Catholic institutions of charity, as among the Indians lately, and the Pueblos. Some would read signs in the act of a Senator attacking a body of the Catholic laity and clergy on an inter-

1 Brandi, Art. 2, § v. 2 Brandi, Art. 2, § v.

nal question, largely fictitious, and that in the national legislature; or, again in the acts of bigoted committees invading the privacy of our homes, and endeavoring to thrust our children into the public schools, as in the two States of Wisconsin and Illinois. When such things happen, the interpretation will be that of the individual observer's habits of mind. At all events, wherever and whenever it is needed, the same policy, which the Pope traces for the somewhat languid constitutional energy of French Catholics, is not only in place with us, but is altogether congenial to our notions and customs of constitutional freedom.

THOMAS HUGHES, S.J.

St. Louis University.

THE NOACHIAN DELUGE.

PART I.

BARRING the creation of the world and of man, it may be questioned if any event recorded in the Old Testament has given rise to more commentaries and provoked more discussion than the terrible cataclysm recorded with such minuteness of detail in the seventh chapter of Genesis. The Fathers, in their interpretations of the inspired volume, and the Schoolmen, in their ponderous tomes, devoted entire treatises to the consideration of the subject. The exegetists who succeeded the Schoolmen found the question of the Deluge no less interesting, and, judging from the space they gave to the discussion of the subject, they considered its elucidation of prime importance. With scarcely a dissenting voice, the Fathers, the Schoolmen, and the exegetists who immediately followed them, were at one, regarding the universality of the catastrophe of which the Sacred Text gives such a vivid record. The words of the Bible were taken literally, and the almost general consensus of opinion among theologians and commentators was that the Deluge was universal, not only in relation to mankind, but also in reference

to the earth's surface. The words describing the great cataclysm seemed to be so clear and so explicit as to preclude the possibility of doubt, and among all classes, as well as with theologians and commentators, it was the generally received opinion—an opinion that, with many, differed but little from an article of faith—an opinion that could not be called in question by any consistent believer in the divine inspiration of the Scriptures without seemingly going counter to the teachings of the Church—that the Flood prevailed over the whole earth and destroyed all the human race except the eight persons who were in the ark of Noah.

Fossil shells found on plain and mountain were appealed to as certain evidences of the magnitude and extent of the Deluge. And so convincing was the argument based on these remains that Voltaire employed all the power of his sophistical pen to demonstrate that such fossil shells were either mere "*lusus naturæ*," or shells that had been dropped by pilgrims on their way home from the Holy Land. Fossils found imbedded in the solid rock, in peat-beds and gravel pits, gave strength to the argument derived from the shells scattered over the earth's surface. So reasoned Scilla and Burnet and Woodward, with a host of others.

But when, later on, the bones of man were discovered in many of the caverns of Europe, it was thought, by those who argued that the Deluge was universal, that the question was put beyond further discussion. Even such a distinguished geologist as Buckland saw in these remains of early man the relics of a universal deluge—*reliquiae Diluvianae*—and the majority of scientific men of his day were disposed to accept his conclusions as correct, and to consider the universality of the biblical Deluge as one of the demonstrated facts of geology. Indeed so anxious were some of those who were interested in making the Sacred Text square with their preconceived notions regarding the nature and extent of the Flood, that they saw a witness of the Deluge—*testis diluvii*—in a fossil that long passed as the skeleton of a man, but which more exact investigation proved to be the remains of an extinct salamander. The *Andrias Scheuchzeri*

—such was the name given this relic of an extinct form of animal life—will always remain a monument to the credulity and the unguarded zeal of those who were too hasty in jumping at conclusions that were not justified by the facts on which they were made to repose.

Whether there are now any geological traces of the Noachian Deluge is doubtful.[1] Even granting that the Flood covered the whole earth as some still contend, it is highly improbable that the changes effected on the earth's surface would have been of such a character as to be recognized so many ages after the event. The late Abbé Moigno who defended to the last day of his life the geographical universality of the Deluge, in referring to this matter, expresses himself as follows: "We refuse to accept as evidence of the Deluge not only the ancient deposits of shells, which existed before it, and which it could not have produced, but also the presence in our part of the world of animal remains which are supposed to have belonged to other climates. We likewise decline to regard as witnesses of the Deluge a certain number of rhinoceroses and elephants, which have been preserved in ice-beds; the countless boulders scattered over the soil, far from the mountains from which they were detached; the organic debris found in caves and alluvial deposits; in a word, almost all that which the illustrious Buckland, in what was probably an excess of orthodoxy, pronounced the relics of the Deluge, *Reliquiae Diluvianae.*[2]

One of the first to seriously controvert the theory of the geographical universality of the Deluge was Isaac Voss—a Protestant theologian, in 1659, in his "*Dissertatio de Vera Mundi Ætate.*" He maintained that not more than the one-hundredth part of the earth was submerged by the Flood. The distinguished Benedictine Dom Mabillon, having, at the

1 See, however, "The Origin of the World," p. 256 and "Modern Science and Bible Lands," Chapters iii & iv, by Sir J. W. Dawson.

2 "*Les Livres Saints et La Science.*" See also "*Splendeurs de la Foi*" Tome III, Chap. xi. For an interesting review of the question consult "*Bibel und Natur,*" by Dr. F. Reusch, Cap. xx, xxi, xxii and xxiii.

request of the Congregation of the Index, examined the work of Voss, gave it as his opinion that the teaching of Voss regarding the non-universality of the Deluge was neither against faith nor morals and could therefore be tolerated.[1]

Among English-speaking geologists, besides Charles Lyell, the first to call in question the universality of the Deluge were the famous Scotch geologist Hugh Miller[2] and the scarcely less eminent American geologist Prof. Edward Hitchcock.[3] Both following Poole and Stillingfleet, directed attention to the fact that the words of the Mosaic account of the Flood did not necessarily imply that the Deluge was universal as to the earth's surface. They argued that it was universal only in so far as man was concerned, and showed that this interpretation was in accordance with both Scripture and the teachings of Science.

At the time the last two mentioned authors wrote, over thirty years ago, the difficulties that had presented themselves to their predecessors against the acceptance of the opinion that the Deluge was universal, had so increased that they seemed well nigh irrefutable. And as the question was more closely examined, and the knowledge of nature became more extensive, new difficulties arose, whilst the older ones instead of disappearing or dwindling in size, rapidly assumed larger proportions. So great indeed was the impetus given to development of the natural sciences, and so numerous and important were the contributions made by zoology and geology, that it soon became evident to every thinking man that the time had come for subjecting the older theories regarding the Deluge to thorough revision.

In the first place no one could any longer seriously maintain that the fossils found in the various strata of the earth's crust were deposited there by the Deluge of Noah. Such a view was now regarded as simply untenable, if not absurd. It

1 "*Haec opinio,*" says Mabillon "*nullum continet errorem capitalem neque contra fidem neque contra bonos mores; itaque tolerari potest et criticorum disputationi permitti.*"

2 Testimony of the Rocks, Lectures vii and viii.

3 Religion and Geology, Lecture iv.

contravened the most elementary principles of geological science—principles about the truth of which there could no longer be any doubt.

Again, owing to the active researches of naturalists the world over, it was discovered that the number of species of animals was far in excess of what had previously been imagined. Indeed when the number came to be computed, it was found to be far too great to find lodgment, not to speak of subsistence, in such an ark as Moses describes. The older interpreters were called upon to make provision for a few hundred species at most. These were all that were then known. Now the number has risen to thousands, yea, to tens of thousands, and additions of new species were being made daily to the already formidable list. Whether, then, the exegetist measured the ark by the Hebraic or the Egyptian cubit, it still remained too small to accommodate such a multitude of living creatures, and contain the food necessary for them during their enforced confinement therein. According to the most liberal calculations, the vessel built by Noah could not have been much larger than—if indeed it was so large as—the Great Eastern. Such a vessel might have been sufficiently capacious for the few hundred species that the Fathers and Schoolmen had in mind, but it was totally inadequate to supply lodgment for the vast multitude that was known at the date at which Miller, Hitchcock and their compeers wrote.

And then a new difficulty presented itself that the earlier commentators could take no note of, and one too, that could not be ignored. The advocates of a universal deluge had taken it for granted, apparently, that all the different species of animal, not to speak of vegetable life, might be found in one place on the earth's surface. Contrary to what Linnaeus had taught, Cuvier and others pointed out the fact, that there are several distinct foci, or centres of animal life ; that certain species and classes of animals are found in one part of the world, while other species have their habitat in another part. Thus Australia is peculiarly the land of marsupials ; Borneo, Java and Sumatra the habitat of the gibbon and the

orang-outang. The giraffe, the zebra and the chimpanzee are indigenous only in Africa, while in America alone are found armadillos, ant-eaters, peccaries, bisons, llamas, and a large group of tailed monkeys entirely different from any ever seen in the Old World. And what holds good for the fauna and flora of to-day, in these different countries, obtains for the fossil remains of the remote geologic past.

It seems unreasonable, therefore, to suppose, even if the ark had been large enough, that representatives of the different species of animals of these various distant countries of the world, came or were brought to the ark. And yet, according to the theory of those who interpret literally the story of the Deluge, there were in the ark Polar bears from Alaska, wapiti from Canada ; tapirs and jaguars, sloths and condors from South America ; lions, gorillas and ostriches from Africa ; elephants and tigers from India and Siam ; lemurs from Madagascar ; kangaroos, ornithorynchi and emues from Australia.

But granting that all these animals, together with representatives of all the other species found in the various parts of the world were in the ark, that there was room and food for them there for a year, the question arises, how did they get there? How were they transported from their distant homes and conveyed across the broad oceans that separated them from the spot where the ark awaited them? And where did this multitude of animals, many of them carnivorous, find food after leaving the ark? The earth then was deserted and desolate. Not a living creature, according to the theory we are now considering, then inhabited it ; nothing that could appease the hunger of the thousands of voracious beasts that could subsist only on the flesh of other animals.

More than this. How were the representatives of all the various faunae of distant continents and far off isles of the ocean returned to the places whence they came? One difficulty suggests another, and the more closely the question is investigated, the more numerous and the more formidable the difficulties become.

The advocates of a universal deluge have a very simple

way of disposing of all objections to their theory. "All things," they argue, "are possible with God; therefore a universal deluge was possible." They admit divine intervention wherever a difficulty presents itself, and tell us it is as easy for God to work a hundred thousand, or a million miracles, as it is for Him to perform one. With them a miracle is the sure and final answer to every objection.

But these good people are assuming what is to be proved. They assume that the Bible teaches the universality of the Deluge, and, on the assumption that it was universal, they proceed at once to call in the aid of divine interposition, to account for everything that cannot be explained by the operation of purely natural agencies. They forget one of the first laws of sound hermeneutics, which forbids the arbitrary introduction of the miraculous in commenting on disputed, or even difficult passages of Scripture. They lose sight of the fact that neither the example of the Fathers, nor that of approved exegetists will permit them to invoke the aid of miracles simply to remove a difficulty, or explain a vexed question of Scripture, especially when the words of the Sacred Text do not warrant one in assuming the fact of a providential intervention. St. Augustine in his "*De Genesi ad Litteram*, and St. Gregory of Nyssa, in his "Hexameron," are very explicit on this point. The substance of their teaching in this matter, briefly stated, is that miracles are not to be multiplied without reason and that they are not to be introduced except when the text demands them, or when it is otherwise inexplicable.

Another difficulty that precluded the acceptance of the geographical universality of the Deluge, was the impossibility of explaining the source of such an immense volume of water as the biblical inundation, if the Mosaic account was to be taken literally, would presuppose. In Genesis we read that "all the fountains of the great deep were broken up and the flood-gates of heaven were opened." "And the waters prevailed beyond measure upon the earth; and all the high mountains under the whole heaven were covered. The water was fifteen cubits higher than the mountains which it

covered." But what do these words signify? Do they mean that the precipitation from the atmosphere and the invasion of the land by floods, caused by the upheaval of the ocean's bed, were sufficient to cover the highest mountains over the whole earth? When we remember that many of the peaks of the Andes and Himalayas are over 20,000 feet high; and that the height of Mount Everest is nearly 30,000 feet, and then call to mind the mean depth of the ocean, according to Murray,[1] 12,400 feet—we shall see that the supply of water would be totally inadequate for such a submergence as is supposed.[2]

Some have imagined that God specially created a sufficient quantity of water to inundate the entire earth, and cover the highest mountain, and that after all flesh outside of the ark had been destroyed He annihilated the water thus specially created. This, however, is an assumption for which there is no warrant in Scripture, and one which is so at variance with the known harmony of the laws of Nature, and so contrary to our ideas of God's providence and wisdom in the government of the world, that it has never been received with favor by exegetists of any weight. No one denies that God could have worked such a miracle, had He so willed, but we are dealing with a question of fact, and not discussing what Omnipotence could, or could not accomplish.

In the light of Science, therefore, especially in the light of geology, zoology and physical geography, the theory of a universal deluge is untenable. On any ground it is untenable without assuming the existence of such a number of miracles that the theory perforce falls by its own weight.[3]

1 Mr. John Murray, of the *Challenger* expedition, is one of the highest living authorities on oceanography.

2 Cf. Le Deluge Biblique et les Races antediluviennes par Jean d' Estrenne, Revue des Questions Scientifiques, Oct. 1885.

3 Among the most distinguished of recent Catholic writers who teach that the Deluge affected only a portion of the earth's surface are Sorignet, Marcel de Serres, Goefroy, Lambert, Michelis, Schouppe, Pianciani, Zschokke, Reusch, Schoebel, Duihle de Saint-Projet, Vigouroux, Delsauz, Hettinger, Güttler, Bosizio, Brucker, Moigno and Lord Arundell of Wardour.

But, it will be asked, What explanation is to be given of the universal terms employed in the biblical account of the Deluge? It is "*all* men" and "*every* living creature" that are to be destroyed; it is the "*whole* earth" that is to be submerged. The words all, every—*totus*, *cunctus*, *omnis*, *universus*—are absolute and exclude nothing. And it is these words, we are told, that must be satisfactorily explained, before we are at liberty to accept any other theory than that which proclaims that the Deluge was universal.

Nothing is of more frequent occurrence in the old Testament than the employment of universal for particular terms. The same peculiarity is observed in the New Testament, but not to such an extent as in the Old. It is a characteristic of all oriental tongues to use hyperbole, and at times, in a way that we should pronounce extravagant. St. Augustine in a letter to St. Paulinus of Nola, states that it is the custom of Scripture to speak of the part as of the whole.[1] He likewise observes that it is frequently necessary to explain the word all—*omnis*—in a restricted sense. He tells his correspondent that there are many passages in the Sacred Text which at first sight present numerous difficulties which, however, forthwith disappear on applying to the terms used a particular instead of a general or absolute signification.

A few examples will illustrate the principle of the great Doctor, and show how universal is its application in explaining even the simplest narratives.

In speaking of the famine which prevailed at the time of Jacob, Moses declares that "the famine prevailed in the whole world," that "the famine increased daily in all the land" and that "all the provinces came into Egypt to buy food and to seek some relief of their want."[2]

None of these passages, however, are to be to be taken literally, notwithstanding the use of the absolute terms—all and whole—*omnis* and *universus*. Moses refers only to the countries and the people known to the Hebrews.

1 Scripturae mos est ita loqui de parte tamquam de toto. Epist. ad Paulin cxlix. See also Pianciani's *Cosmogonia Naturale Comparata col Genesi*, pp. 243-245.

2 Genesis, xii, 54, 56, 57.

In a similar manner is to be explained the analogous passage in the Book of Kings, where we read "And all the earth desired to see Solomon's face and to hear his wisdom, which God had given in his heart."[1] Our Lord, Himself, uses similar language when He declares that the Queen of Saba "came from the ends of the earth to hear the wisdom of Solomon." St. Luke, in like manner, speaks in the same general terms when he tells us in the Acts of the Apostles, that at the time of the descent of the Holy Ghost on the Apostles there were assembled in Jerusalem "devout men out of every nation under heaven."

In the case of the famine in the time of Jacob, the people referred to did not live more than a few hundred miles, at most, from the home of the patriarch. The Queen of Saba dwelt, most likely, in Southern Arabia, distant some ten or twelve hundred miles. The representatives of every nation under heaven in Jerusalem at the feast of Pentecost came from the countries that were then known to the Jewish people, and, to judge from those named, none who were present at the time came from points distant more than a few thousand miles at farthest. No exegetist has ever thought of taking the words literally, or of imagining that there were then present in the Holy City, Chinese and Japanese, Indians from Peru and Mexico, and strangers from the isles of the South Pacific. And yet, if the words were to be taken literally, one would be perfectly justified in making such a supposition.

A still more striking illustration of hyperbole so characteristic of Hebrew thought and language, is found in Sophonias: "Gathering, I will gather together all things from off the face of the land, saith the Lord. I will gather man and beast, I will gather the birds of the air, and the fishes of the sea: and the ungodly shall meet with ruin: and I will destroy men from off the face of the land, saith the Lord."[2]

Here, to take the words literally, we have a menace of universal destruction. Not only all men and all animals are to be destroyed, but all birds of the air and all fishes of the sea. The words threatening the destruction of animate

1 iii Kings, 24. 2 Sophonias, 1, 2 and 4.

nature by the Deluge, do not imply more, are not more precise and far reaching. But what are the object and extent of divine wrath as expressed in these sweeping words of the prophet? Some interpreters tell us that reference is made to the land and people of Juda; others say that the menace is directed against Babylon, while others still maintain that the prophecy refers to the Phoenicians and other peoples on the borders of Palestine. But whatever be the exact meaning of the text, it is generally agreed among commentators, that the universal terms employed have a meaning that is, if anything, more restricted than similar words in any of the passages yet quoted.

And so is it in many other instances that might be adduced. The whole earth—*omnis terra*—sometimes applies only to the Promised Land; sometimes it embraces only Egypt. At other times the same words are made to refer to the Kingdom of David, or of Solomon; and at others again to a stretch of country bounded by the invisible horizon.[1]

It is a mistake to suppose that the words of Scripture are self-explanatory, or that we can arrive at the signification of words by considering them in themselves, and apart from what precedes or follows them. In some cases we can determine the precise meaning of the terms used from the context. In others we must have recourse to parallel texts, and study the meaning of the passage in question in the light of the genius of the language, and of the temperament of the people who spoke it. Many readers of the Scriptures fall into egregious errors by imagining that they are obliged to apply the same rules of interpretation and criticism to the florid, picturesque, and hyperbolical languages of the Orient as they would in studying the meaning of an author who had written in English, French, or German. Sound, logical exegesis however, as Reithmayer has so clearly expressed it, requires us to interpret Scripture according to the mind of the writer, and according to the mind of those for whom the author speaks.

1 *Le Deluge Biblique devant la Foi, l' Ecriture et la Science.* Par Al. Motais, p. 52.

But conceding the gravity of the objections offered by science against the acceptance of the theory of an universal deluge, and granting that the words of the Bible may, in certain cases, be interpreted in a restricted sense, are we justified in concluding from these facts, that such a restricted use of language is applicable to the account that Moses gives of the flood of Noah? Comparing the language employed in the description of the Deluge with that used in other passages of the inspired writings, it may be admitted that, *in se*, a restricted meaning *may* be attributed to the universal terms that occur in the narrative, but, it will be asked, will the traditional interpretation that has been assigned to the great catastrophe permit us any liberty of opinion on the subject under discussion?

What have the Fathers and Doctors of the Church thought and taught? What have the Schoolmen and commentators of a subsequent age believed and professed? And are we not obliged to accept the traditional teaching—the teaching of the early Fathers, and that of the Mediæval Schools—as the teaching of the Church? And if it be found that these venerated and venerable authorities have, with almost unbroken unanimity, held that the Deluge was universal, can we, as faithful children of the Church—*citra jacturam pietatis*—as Melchior Cano expresses it, reject their teaching, and regard the contrary view as tenable?

We may for the nonce admit that the Fathers and Doctors, theologians and commentators for the first sixteen centuries of the Church's history, almost unanimously believed and taught that the Flood was universal. But, granting this to be true, are we obliged to regard their beliefs and teachings as anything more than the expressions of personal opinions concerning matters that anyone is free to discuss? Or are we to consider their consensus of opinion regarding the Flood as a part of that body of doctrine which cannot be impugned without scandal and danger to faith?

Let us examine. It may at once be premised that very few of the texts of the Holy Scripture have been explicitly defined by the Church. And it may at the same time

be further observed that an equally small number of passages are regarded as authoritatively and infallibly interpreted by the unanimous exegesis of the Fathers. Hence, of the thousands of paragraphs of which the Holy Scripture is composed, the number on which the Church and her Doctors have pronounced authentic and solemn judgment is very small indeed.

The question now arises: Is the narrative of the Deluge to be classed among those parts of Scripture to which have been given an authoritative interpretation? We can say unhesitatingly, that in so far as the Church is concerned, as represented by her supreme ruler, nothing whatever has been decided. There is no Papal judgment, or interpretation bearing on the subject. In this respect, therefore, we are at full liberty to elect any theory regarding the Deluge that may commend itself to our judgment.

But is not the consensus of opinion of the Fathers and Doctors of the Church of that kind which we are compelled to accept as a part of the dogmatic teaching of the Church? Let us see what are our privileges, and what are our obligations in the face of patristic and scholastic teaching and opinions.

A decree of the Council of Trent, renewed by the Council of the Vatican, declares that in "matters of faith and morals pertaining to the building up of Christian doctrine, . . . it is forbidden to interpret Scripture contrary to the unanimous consent of the Fathers."[1]

Now according to Pallavicini, the great historian of the Council of Trent—"the Council had no intention to prescribe a new rule, or to restrain by new laws the manner of interpreting the Word of God, but simply declared as illicit and heretical what was so by its nature, and what had always been held and proclaimed as such by Fathers, Pontiffs and Councils."

The decree had no reference to certain questions of minor importance—*quaestiunculae*, as St. Vincent of Lerins calls them, connected with Biblical interpretation. It referred

1 Con. Trid. Sess. iv; Conc. Vatic., Constit. De Fide Catholica, 2.

rather to fundamental questions of faith and morals—or, as the same St. Vincent puts it, to *his dumtaxpat praecipue quaestionibus quibus totius Catholici dogmatis fundamenta nituntur.*

"When," says Cardinal Franzelin, "we inquire what is the measure of the authority which the unanimous consent of the Fathers possesses in a question of theology, it is necessary to distinguish the different ways in which a given doctrine may be proposed by them, and to consider whether their opinion regarding such a doctrine is or is not tantamount to a declaration that it belongs to the common faith of the Church, or whether, on the contrary, their consensus of opinion may not rather refer to a doctrine, or an explanation of a doctrine, connected indeed with religion and truth, but not so clearly proposed as to entitle it to be regarded as a dogma of faith." [1]

When there is question of Councils or Popes giving decisions, it is necessary, the same theologian declares, that they speak "in the plentitude of their authority, and that they deliver authentically a dogma proposed for universal acceptance."

If, then, explicit and authentic definition is required when Popes and Councils speak, for a much stronger reason equal certainty of definition is demanded when there is question of the authority of the Fathers. It is important in this connection to remember the statement of Bossuet that "the Fathers, in the interpretation of the Scriptures do not urge the literal sense except when confirming dogmas, and refuting heretics."

Hence, Pallavicini teaches, it is necessary that there be question not only of doctrinal matters, but also of dogmas to be believed, and that the sense of the Sacred Text be *declared certain* by the unanimous teaching of the Fathers. It is necessary that the signification of the text be approved as a dogma of faith—*tanquam dogma fidei a cunctis Ecclesiae Doctoribus comprobari*—and that the Fathers condemn, or show that they are disposed to condemn, as a heretic any one who

1 Franzelin, De Divina Traditione et Scriptura, Sect. II, Cap I.

rejects the truth which they enunciate, or the article of faith which they proclaim. If, however, the Fathers regard a doctrine simply as religious and true, if they declare themselves only as if expressing an opinion "*opinantium modo*" —they teach us by their example that we also may have the same liberty of opinion. Wherefore, in order that the *Consensus Patrum* may bear on the face of it the formula of Catholic truth, it must carry with it the evidences of undoubted and explicit dogmatic decisions.[1]

St. Thomas Aquinas makes a beautiful distinction between things which are necessarily of faith, and things which pertain to faith only accidentally, which will serve to elucidate the question under discussion. The Trinity and Unity of God, for instance, belongs necessarily—*per se*—to the substance of faith. Many things of an historical nature—*historialia*—appertain to faith only accidentally—*per accidens* —about which even the Saints have entertained different views, and regarding which they have given different interpretations. Thus, that the world was created, belongs to the substance of faith, and such is the unanimous teaching of the Fathers. But the manner and order of creation pertains to faith only accidentally. Hence many different explanations have been given regarding these questions without, in the least, affecting the truth of Scripture.[2]

The distinction the Angelic Doctor lays down regarding the creation of the world applies, it seems, with equal force to the Noachian Deluge. The fact of the Deluge no one can deny. Neither may we call in question the prophecy announcing the Flood, nor the purpose which it subserved. These are of faith, and explicitly declared so even by our Lord and His Apostles. The prophecy, we must admit, was miraculous, and, therefore supernatural. The Deluge, although Providential, we may believe was but natural. The Almighty by His foreknowledge simply availed Himself of natural agents in carrying out the execution of His decrees.

1 See Motais, Le Deluge Biblique, pp. 132, et seq., whose argument we have here followed.

2 In Lib. II, Sent., Distinct xii, Art. 2.

We are at liberty, therefore, to maintain that the occurrence of the Deluge was natural, as we may believe that the destruction of Jerusalem was natural. The latter event was foretold with even greater detail than the former, but in both instances it was natural causes—in one the forces of Nature, in the other human agency—that were executors of the divine Will.

And if we are free to explain the Deluge by the action of causes purely physical, we may likewise, *a fortiori*, avail ourselves of the same liberty of interpretation regarding the extent to which the catastrophe prevailed. Father de Smet, the celebrated president of the Bollandists, expresses this idea forcibly when he declares that "the Catholic *savant*, when in presence of a prodigy whose miraculous character is not clearly attested by a divine witness, has full liberty to examine it with all the severity which characterizes the discussion of miracles by the members of the Sacred Congregation of Rites in cases of beatification and canonization." Even granting that the Scriptures declared not only the fact of the Deluge, but also informed us in detail as to its extent, and the causes which operated in its production, such a recital would be an object of Catholic faith only accidentally, inasmuch as it constitutes a part of the Sacred Text, but it would not of itself, as St. Thomas and Franzelin teach, enter into the things of faith and morals that pertain to the building up of Christian doctrine as based on the infallible interpretation of the Fathers.

What St. Thomas says of matters which are purely historical—*historialia*—Patrizzi declares of matters of science and philosophy. "You will not find," this eminent theologian declares, "questions which are purely philosophical, treated by the Fathers as pertaining to religion and Christian piety."[1] St. Augustine expresses the same sentiment with equal force and clearness. "In the obscurities of natural things," the great Doctor observes "in which we recognize the Omnipotence of God, we must proceed, not by affirming, but by inquiring, especially when there is question of treating books

1 Institut. de Interpretatione Bibliorum, Cap. v.

commended to us by divine authority.[1] In such matters therefore, in questions namely, that are purely historical, philosophical or scientific, as prescinded from any clear and certain connection with matters of faith and morals, we have all the liberty of examination and discusssion that even the most exacting investigator could reasonably desire. For this reason it is that Melchior Cano, when speaking of the nature and force of traditional interpretation, does not hesitate to declare, anent such subjects, as the one under examination, that "if all the Fathers had erred in their opinions, they would have been wrong in matters of slight moment."

We have assumed, for the sake of argument, that the Fathers and Doctors of the Church were at one as to their views of the universality of the Deluge. This assumption, although in the main true, requires qualification. Their teaching although apparently unanimous, admits of some exceptions. which in discussion of questions like the present, have especial significance.

Thus, notwithstanding the absolute expressions "all the earth"—*omnis terra*—some of the Fathers and older writers exclude Olympus and Atlas from the effects of the inundation, contending that these mountains were too high for the waters of the Deluge to reach their summits. Others make the same exception for the Garden of Eden. Others, again, go much farther, and say that the waters of the Deluge did not reach the summits of any of the mountains but remained only on the plains below.

More than this. They made exceptions without any apparent hesitation, not only for different parts of the earth's surface, but also for different kinds of animal life. They found justification for such exceptions in various reasons—some of them very fanciful indeed—of science, and history and exegesis.[2] But the important fact disclosed by these exceptions made by the Fathers and contemporary authors, who were faithful children of the Church, is that they throw light on the bearing or Scripture exegesis at the time in

1 De Genes. ad litteram, Cap. i.

2 See Motais, Le Deluge Biblique, p. 160.

question on the meaning to be attached to the words "all the earth," and "all flesh." If one exception could be made—the Fathers made many—what is to prevent us from freely interpreting the narrative of the Deluge in the restricted sense which we have been advocating. Even aside from the principles of interpretation which we have been considering, we should be justified by the example of the Fathers themselves in upholding the theory of the non-universality of the Flood.

What has been said of the Fathers, may, with equal truth, be affirmed of the Schoolmen, and the exegetists who succeed them. The Fathers in their capacity of witnesses and doctors of Tradition, are, as Franzelin teaches, one of the essential parts of the magisterium and ministry divine—human, instituted by God for the propagation of Christian doctrine in the world. But if the opinions of these preordained witnesses to the truth of Tradition are not binding on our reason except when they possess all the characters demanded by theology and the Church for a stronger reason, the unanimous consent of the School cannot be said to have such authority over our reason and conscience. This is what Pius IX means when he declares that the constant and unanimous consent of theologians must refer not only to *matters of faith*, but that the doctrine taught must be held as *true* and as of *Catholic faith*.[1]

And yet more. The common opinion of the Scholastics, even when deduced from sources of revelation, is not of faith as Franzelin teaches, except when the truths it teaches are declared to be such. Suarez assigns several reasons why such an unanimous opinion may not be of faith. "First, the text of Scripture in question may be so worded as to admit of several interpretations. Second, because the Church has given no decision in the matter. Third, because Tradition is not decisive on the question."[2]

These declarations refer especially to opinions which are subject to change—to opinions which even the Schoolmen

1 Encyclical of Dec. 21, 1863.

2 Quoted by Motais in "Le Deluge Biblique," p. 175.

themselves did not hesitate to abandon when sufficient reasons for so doing were forthcoming. Opinions regarding certain matters of science, history and philosophy would come under this head. They would naturally change with the advance of knowledge and the progress of research. The various opinions entertained regarding the six days of creation is a case in point. And scarcely less noteworthy in this respect is the question of the universality of the Deluge. It is a question rather of science and archaeology than of pure theology. Hence the changes of opinion that have been occasioned by modern scientific investigations and the new views that are now entertained by apologists and exegetists.

The Fathers, as we have seen, interpret the text regarding the total destruction of mankind according to its most obvious meaning. They had no reason to hold a different opinion from that which they professed. The state of knowledge at their time did not admit of any other view, and even if one could have been formulated, there would have been no means of verifying it.

Like the Fathers, the Schoolmen gave an opinion on an equivocal passage of Scripture, without any profound investigation, for the simple reason that the necessary data for such investigation were almost entirely wanting. As a matter of habit, as it were, without reasoning and without reflection they accepted as true the opinions of the Fathers, but made no attempt to establish the truth of these opinions.

But while they took it for granted that the opinions taught were true, they did not propose them as necessary articles of belief. The very manner in which they express themselves evinces the contrary. Indeed a brief examination of the way in which the Schoolmen treated the question of the universality of the Deluge will convince one that the common opinion that was held regarding the catastrophe was one of those which, as De Lugo says, might be universally defended in one age, and in consequence of the progress of research be as universally rejected in the next. And no less an authority

than Cardinal Franzelin tells us that an opinion that has obtained general acceptance among theologians may sometimes, by reason of the discovery of new data, or because of more profound investigations, lose much of its pristine authority, or even be abandoned entirely.

It may then be accepted as a fact, which no one can gainsay, that not a single Scholastic, nor indeed any Catholic theologian of repute, has ever taught, from any point of view whatever, that the universality of the Deluge is of faith. The consent of Doctors may have been universal, but it was regarding a matter that was always open for examination and discussion. The consent therefore, was at best a matter of opinion, and not one of positive judgment or dogmatic definition. It was an opinion that obtained for centuries, not because it was not open to controversy but because the materials supplied by modern criticism, and indispensable for successfully grappling with the question were not then available. It was an opinion that had not been tried in the crucible of modern exegesis, and one, consequently, that never had any of the notes of truth and certitude possessed by a dogma of faith. The unanimity in question was, at best, something purely negative and cannot be construed as authoritatively opposing a theory that, in the very nature of the case, was, at the time of which we speak, incapable of being formulated.

True it is, the opinion is one that prevailed for over a thousand years—one that was discussed in many bulky volumes from the times of St. Augustine and Tostatus to those of Mersenne and Pereira. But time alone, in the discussion of such a question, is not an important factor. If it were a question of principles, or one of pure theology, where all the elements and documents necessary for the elucidation of the case were at hand, the application of the ordinary rules of logic would be all that were necessary to draw certain and infallible conclusions. In such a case the solution of the question would involve nothing more than simple reflection and ratiocination, and a genius like that of a St. Augustine, or a St. Thomas Aquinas, would not demand

time as an indispensable prerequisite for arriving at a conclusion.

But with questions of physical and natural science, of history and philosophy, of archaeology and linguistics, it is quite otherwise. Hence St. Augustine, Origen and other Doctors felt constrained to leave to time the clearing up of many difficulties, which in the state of limited information in their day were insoluble. If the illustrious Bishop of Hippo could, toward the end of his life, find, in his writings, materials for a volume of retractions, how much more, if he were now living, would he not discover, in those obscure natural questions that in his time were so puzzling, to amend or reject? And if now in all the light of modern research and with the aid of sciences that were unknown to the Fathers and the Schoolmen, we still encounter insuperable difficulties, even in connection with the question now under examination, how lenient should we not be in passing judgment on opinions that were then formed and generally received—opinions which their authors would be the first to modify or abandon, if they were now living, or if they had had the data and information that modern natural and physical science have placed at our disposal?

(*End of Part I.*)

J. A. ZAHM, C.S.C.

THE THEODICY OF ARISTOTLE.

PSYCHOLOGY.

FOURTH THESIS.

FIRST PART.—SPIRITUALITY OF THE SOUL.
SECOND PART.—THE SOUL A CONSTITUENT OF HUMAN NATURE.
THIRD PART.—THE SOUL NOT PRE-EXISTENT.
FOURTH PART.—THE SOUL OF IMMEDIATE DIVINE ORIGIN.
FIFTH PART.—THE SOUL IS IMMORTAL.

FIRST PART.

SPIRITUALITY OF THE SOUL.

Aristotle teaches that soul is the form and first act of a living being. (Entelecheia.) The animal soul is submerged in the matter of the body which it actuates, its

operation is merely and altogether organic, it has no separate subsistence, and vanishes when the animal becomes a carcass, just as the sphere vanishes when the spherical lump of lead is melted. The rational human soul, on the contrary, is not submerged in the matter which it animates, like a fish in the water it is like a swimmer, whose head and shoulders are above the surface. That is, as form and act of a living body, it is what the animal soul is, and does what it does, animating matter and operating with it organically ; but it is something more, and does something more. Operation is determined by the specific nature of the operator. Therefore, from the specific nature of the operation, the specific nature of the operator is inferred. Thought and rational volition are super-organic and incorporeal operations, which must be referred to a subject which is incorporeal, to a vital principle which acts from itself, independently of an organ and of matter. Not dependent on matter for its operation it is not dependent on it for its existence. It is not a form educed from the potentiality of matter, but is self-subsisting, substantial, as spirit. Although, during its strictly human period of existence, as the animating principle of a body, it is not a separate subsisting and complete substance, but is an incomplete substance, substantially united with another incomplete substance to constitute one complex essence and nature ; it is, nevertheless, *separable*, and capable of subsisting by and in itself, after the dissolution of its union with the corruptible body by the actual corruption of the corporeal part of the human nature. After death, the separable soul has become separate, has ceased to be the form and act of a living body, to animate it as its vital principle, and to fulfill in its organs the functions of vegetative and sensitive life, and it is merely what it is in itself, and by itself, living the life of a separate spirit. "After it is separated, it is still only what remains in existence (after the dissolution of the complete human substance) and this alone is immortal and everlasting." (Arist. On the Soul. b. 3. c. 5.)

SECOND PART.

THE SOUL A CONSTITUENT OF HUMAN NATURE.

The sense of this is, that the *rational* soul, the intelligent, thinking part of a man belongs to the human composite, as a constituent part of man.

The proposition is principally directed against the assumption that in Aristotle's psychology the active intellect, the *Nous*, in men, is not a distinct, individual principle in each one, but a kind of individualized presence of the Divine Spirit. According to this notion, Aristotle regarded the human soul as an animal soul having the possible intellect which Döllinger incorrectly identifies with the faculty which German Transcendentalists call understanding (Verstand) in distinction from reason (Vernunft) annexed to it, and enlightened by the presence of the divine *Nous*. At death, the *Nous* leaves the soul to sink back into nothingness, so that the entire human individual becomes extinct. This interpretation is referred to Alexander of Aphrodisias as its author, and is sustained in recent times by Döllinger, who was a historian but no philosopher. The latter gives it a fatal blow by his admission that it places one part of Aristotle's philosophy in diametrical contradiction with another part.

Nearly related to this opinion is that of the Arabians, according to which the *Nous* in men is not the Divine Spirit but a created over-soul common to all men. Again, Averroes and others have maintained that not only the *intellectus agens* but also the *intellectus possibilis* is something separate from the *ego* in man and is one in all men.

Any one who will read the text of Aristotle's treatise on the soul, and who understands his psychology and theory of cognition, and his theodicy as well, will perceive that these fanciful theories have not been deduced from the metaphysics of Aristotle. They are a creation of the imagination of their inventors, super-imposed on Aristotle's psychology, and derived from Neo-Platonic and pantheistic conceptions, altogether alien from the spirit of the Peripatetic School. These interpreters have sought to explain the divine and the eternal which Aristotle distinguishes in the human soul from

its other attributes, possessed in common with purely animal souls. Ascribing to him the doctrine that the individual man is a mere animal, who receives his total substance by generation from his parents, and is therefore in his total subsistence a perishable being, whose individual existence entirely ceases at death; they could find no place in the essence of his soul for the divine and eternal. It must be, therefore, something separate, which has existed apart from eternity, which comes to the soul from without and abandons it again at death. Some, who have regarded the divine and eternal element in the human soul as something pertaining to the individual *ego* in each single human person, have imagined that it existed from eternity as a separate essence, and is joined to the natural part of the soul when this is produced by generation, making it intelligent for the time being, but again separated from it at death; and continuing to exist forever in some vague way, without any continuity of self-consciousness, and with no character as a vital principle of immortal life in any one subject.

These fanciful hypotheses are all ingenious but absurd artifices, to give some kind of meaning to Aristotle's declarations respecting a divine, immortal element in human nature, without recurring to the one and only alternative, viz.: that the essence of the soul is spiritual, that it has its origin from the act of God giving it existence when it becomes the form of the body, and preserving it in immortal, conscious, intelligent life, after the material body has become the prey of death. Those who have not believed in God as the First and Final Cause of the world, have for this reason been unwilling to yield up the great philosopher to Theists and Christians. Those who have been Theistic or Christian philosophers have, in some way, failed to perceive and assert their right to claim Aristotle as their own.

Not so, however, St. Thomas, Suarez and the older scholastics, who have mastered and made their own the psychology of Aristotle, and have incorporated it into their metaphysics.

This psychology is the most perfect, complete and satisfac-

tory portion of the scholastic special metaphysics; the only one which harmonizes all the branches of anthropology as they are now scientifically treated, and reduces all to the unity and solidity of a true science.

Aristotle teaches the substantial unity of the human composite, in which the soul is the form and act of the living being, itself spiritual, and having, beyond and above its organic operations, an operation which is *sui generis* and super-organic; proceeding from an intellectual faculty native to the soul, in virtue of which the soul is from the beginning of its existence virtually intelligent and a receptacle of supersensible ideas. By its active power of abstraction the intellect apprehends the intelligble which is veiled by the phantasmata of sensitive cognition, and becomes actually intelligent. The whole man is bound together body and soul in unity, and the lower faculties serve the highest, which in one aspect is called intellect and in another reason, the supreme ruler in the microcosm. Man is therefore a *rational animal.*

The notion of something extraneous to the human essence destroys this entire psychology and theory of cognition. Some shadowy entity out of eternity, some over-soul, or the Deity itself, thinks and knows in the animal, man; but the animal is not itself intelligent and rational, the *man* neither thinks nor knows. But, according to Aristotle, sensation, intelligence, both in its passive and active modes, and discursive reason, are parts of the one substantive and subsisting subject, *man*, whose *ego* includes them all. As we proceed, it will be shown that the divine in man is so called because it has its origin from God, and is similar to Him, and is eternal, because it is independent of matter in respect to its operation and being, and therefore continues to live forever; surviving the body which dies, and of whose future resurrection Aristotle could have no knowledge.

The notion that it is the Divine Spirit who is the thinking and willing subject in man, springs from a total misunderstanding of Aristotle's conception of God as the prime mover. It is God who gives first being to the thinking and willing subject and to his faculties; it is He who gives the impulse

to thought and volition, just as He is the first cause of the movements of the heavenly bodies. But He is no more the one who elicits thoughts and volitions in men, than He is the one who shines in the sun and revolves in the planets.

THIRD PART.

THE SOUL NOT PRE-EXISTENT.

The soul first begins to exist with the body of which it is the form, and act; and this is true of the soul, not merely as it is the vital principle of the body, but also as it is mind or spirit. As form and act of the body, it evidently cannot have an existence prior to that of the body. But the soul is all one, and it is the same essence viewed as mind, and as vital principle of vegetative and sensitive life. Since Aristotle teaches that every substantial form begins to exist with the substance of which it is a constituent part, it must be presumed that he includes the human soul in the same category with other forms, unless he distinctly affirms the contrary. This he never does, and never affirms the pre-existence of the soul. This notion accords with the Platonic, but has no place in the Aristotelian psychology. It is a mere inference from the statement that spirit or mind in man cannot be produced by generation, but must be infused from without. However, coming from without is not the same thing with coming from a pre-existing separate state. It denotes only that it has its origin *aliunde*.

Moreover Aristotle explicitly denies the pre-existence of the soul. In the Metaphysics (12, 3) he says that every form begins to exist with the being whose form it is, but that this does not hinder that some forms continue to exist after the dissolution of the being, as we must hold is the case with the human spirit. Aristotle teaches, therefore, that the human soul is a form which begins to exist with the human body, does not, therefore, come into it from a state of prior existence, but still continues to exist after the dissolution of the composite human essence. There is, therefore, no origin possible for it, except by creation. It is aversion from this conclusion which has driven so many to insist that Aristotle

held to the eternal pre-existence of the intelligent principle in the human soul.

FOURTH PART.

THE IMMEDIATE DIVINE ORIGIN OF THE SOUL.

It has been proved already that Aristotle teaches that the human soul does not originate from generation, and does not exist from eternity. It must have some origin and there is none which is thinkable, except a becoming through an act of the divine omnipotence.

Aristotle's affirmation that the soul is *divine*, can have only one of two meanings. It is either eternal, coming into the body from the beginning of life; or it is of divine *origin*, brought into existence by divine power, and united with the body, as its form and act. The first alternative is inadmissible, and there remains only the second.

In the fourteenth chapter of the eighth book of the Ethics, Aristotle says, that parents and the gods are the authors of our being, the obvious sense of which is, that the part of man which does not proceed by generation from parents, has a divine origin.

FIFTH PART.

IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

It has, in fact, been already proved that Aristotle teaches the immortality of the spiritual part of man. In one sense, this is undisputed. Those who regard the *Nous* of Aristotelian psychology as a common over-soul, or as the Deity itself, admit without difficulty its perpetual existence. But this is not the perpetual continuity of the individual life which begins in the embryo, persists in the human subject during the period of vital union between the soul and the body, and survives the dissolution of this union, indestructible and everlasting.

It is precisely this kind of immortality which has been already proved. It has been proved, viz., that the soul of each individual man is a numerical unit, indivisible in itself,

and divided from every other soul. In this distinct, individual existence, therefore, it survives the body and continues to live after the death of the body. Death has no power over it. The power of nature attains its ultimatum in giving sensitive life, and can neither produce nor destroy a spirit. As has been shown already, the separability of the soul from the body, and its capacity for existence and activity in a separate state, depends, according to Aristotle, on an affirmative decision of the question, whether it has a purely spiritual, super-organic act.

"It is also a question in respect to the affections of the soul, whether they are all, without exception, common to the entire subject as a composite of soul and body, or whether there is one affection exclusively proper to the soul itself . . . as in respect to thought there is the most appearance that such is the case. . .If now, among the affections or activities of the soul, there are some exclusively proper to it, then it can be separated, but if it have no exclusive property, then it is not separable, but similar to the tangent of a copper ball, which has no existence or function apart from a body." (Arist. On The Soul, I, 1, 403, a, 3 ff.)

"In respect to the mind and the thinking power, it is by no means proved (that it is on a level with the faculty of sense cognition) but it seems to be another kind of soul, and this alone can be separated, *as the eternal from the transitory.*" (Id. 11, 2, 413, b. 24.)

In the first of these passages it is affirmed that a function which proves spirituality, wherever there is such a function, must be *thought.* The nature of the intellectual operation is investigated in the third book. Because its product is the universal concept through which the entire being of corporeal things is apprehended, the intellectual power itself must be incorporeal, free from any mixture with matter. "Necessarily, therefore, the *Nous*, because thinks all things, must be unmixed, in order that it may have dominion, that is, may know." (429, a, 18.) Now follows as the last link of the chain, a positive affirmation of what had been

before hypothetically proposed: viz., that the spirit, because it is unmixed (with matter) and operative without any bodily organ, is immortal and forever existing. "But after it has become separate, it is only that which it is, (which has its being in and by itself, not merely with the essence of which it is the form) and this alone is immortal and everlasting."

Dr. Rolfes concludes his fourth part by the discussion of a difficulty which seems to be the most serious one of all that can be raised against the thesis which he defends. It seems to me that in this discussion, he is too brief to be sufficiently clear and satisfactory in his solution. The difficulty arises from a statement of Aristotle that we have no remembrance, *i.e.* as is generally understood and as the obvious meaning appears to be, that we have no remembrance of this life remaining in the soul after it has become separated from the body. It is from the passage in which this statement occurs, and another which will be quoted presently, that the argument against the proposition that Aristotle teaches the immortality of the soul in the proper sense, is derived.

"We have, however, no remembrance, for this (the immortal intellect), is impassible, the passible understanding, moreover, is corruptible, and without it, the other (the impassible intellect), thinks nothing." If then, as some interpret this text to assert, the human spirit in the separate state, does not and can not think, its perpetual existence is equivalent to non-existence, since it has no proper activity, and exists for no purpose. Besides, in another place, Aristotle seems to deny to the surviving part of the soul all operation of intelligence after death. In the first book of the Nichomachian Ethics, (1, 11, inst.) he criticises a saying of Solon, that no one is to be accounted happy before death. "Now, if we admit this, will one, therefore, first become happy when he departs out of this life? Or is that a futile notion, any way you take it, especially, however, according to our apprehension that happiness consists in activity?"

Does Aristotle mean to say, as Döllinger and others suppose, that it is absurd to regard a soul as happy after

death, because happiness consists in activity, of which the separated spirit is incapable?

I think the best way to answer this question is to quote entire the comment of St. Thomas on the two texts cited above.

"When (Aristotle) says 'separatus autem' he lays down the conditions of the whole intellective part. First, he affirms the truth. Secondly, he removes the objection, beginning at the words 'non reminiscitur.' In the first place he says that the separate intellect alone is that which truly is. ('Separatus autem est solum hoc, quod vere est. Et hoc solum immortale et perpetuum est.') Now this cannot be understood either of the active intellect alone, or of the possible intellect alone, but of *both together, because he had said previously of each of them, that it is separate.*"

This is the key to the whole difficulty, which arises from the supposition that the surviving spirit is an imperfect intelligence, having the *intellectus agens*, but not the *intellectus possibilis.*

"It is plain that he here speaks of the *entire intellective part*, which is called separate because it has its operation without a corporeal organ. And because he had said in the beginning of this book, that if there is any operation which is proper to the soul, it happens to the soul to be separated; he concludes that this part of the soul alone, to wit the intellective, is incorruptible and perpetual. He had affirmed the same thing in the second book, viz., that this kind of soul is separated from other parts (of the human nature) as what is perpetual from the corruptible. It is called, however, perpetual, not because it always was, but because it always will be. Wherefore, the Philosopher says, in the twelfth book of the Metaphysics, that the form is never prior to the matter, but that the soul remains as posterior to the matter, not as a whole, but as intellect.

Again, when he says "non reminiscitur" he puts aside a certain objection. For some one might believe, that because the intellective part of the soul is incorruptible, the intellectual cognition of things remains in the soul after death, in

the same mode in which it now has it—the contrary of which position he had already maintained in the first book, that intelligence suffers decay when some inward part decays (*i. e.* that mental activity is affected by the decay of vital organs) and that when the body is corrupted the soul neither remembers nor loves. And therefore he says here that there is no memory, namely after death, of those things which we have known in life, because "hoc quidem impassibile est," that is, this part of the intellective soul is impassible, wherefore it is not the subject of the passions of the soul, such as love, hatred, reminiscence and the like, *which happen from some bodily passive impression.* But the passive understanding is corruptible; to wit, that part of the soul which is not without the aforesaid passions is corruptible; for *these belong to the sensitive part.* Nevertheless this part of the soul is called understanding, as it is also called rational, *inasmuch as it after a certain fashion participates in reason, by obeying reason*, and by following its direction, as it is said in the first book of Ethics. But without this corporeal part of the soul, the intellect understands nothing. For it does not understand anything *sine phantasmate*, (nihil est in intellectu quod non prius erat in sensu) as will be hereafter explained. And therefore, after the destruction of the body, there does not remain in the soul, now separately existing, a knowledge of things, according to the *same mode in which it now understands.* (The intellect does not act, as now, *conversione ad phantasmata sensibilia.*) But, in what mode the soul does then exercise intelligence, it is not within the scope of the present argument to discuss." (Lectio X, in b. 3, de Anima.)

The second passage quoted above, from the Ethics, is easily disposed of, after the first one has been explained. St. Thomas, in very few words, gives the correct exposition of the statement that felicity consists in a certain activity, and therefore a dead man cannot be called happy, since he seems not to have any activity. "It is to be noted that the Philosopher does not speak of the felicity of the future life, but of the felicity of the present life, whether it can be attributed to a man while he lives, or only at death."[1] Dr.

1 Lect. xv. in I. l. Ethic.

Rolfes repeats the explanation of St. Thomas on both passages in his own words, and when carefully examined by one who thoroughly understands the psychology of Aristotle, it is quite sufficient to remove the difficulty.

The author concludes his Treatise with the following words, which are words of wisdom and worthy of all attention from Catholic philosophers.

"The correct elucidation of Aristotle, that is to say of his writings treating of the higher philosophy, is an almost impossible undertaking, without the aid of the scholastic works from which help in their interpretation can be drawn, especially the Commentaries of St. Thomas Aquinas. For a knowledge and comprehension of the entire Aristotelian system and of its particular parts is requisite, in order to an adequate interpretation of their text. Now a searching investigation and a luminous reproduction of all Aristotle, which is such a gigantic work, especially for a single student, lies ready at hand in an inimitable perfection, in the Commentaries of Aquinas. We should hold by these, though of course this does not imply that a better understanding of particular passages may not be sometimes gained."

It is needless to remark that the author has followed the counsel he gives to others, and that all the propositions defended under his several theses are sustained by the authority of St. Thomas Aquinas. And here we take leave of him, regretting only that he has not given us a much longer and fuller treatise on the philosophy of the great prince of heathen sages, who has written so much that would do honor to a Doctor of the Church.

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THE MORALITY OF ROUND DANCES.

THE subject of "Round Dances" presents itself periodically to the pastor of souls as one of the public evils against which it is his duty to devise efficient measures.

There is a not uncommon impression that the church-laws forbid *round* dances but allow others, as though the morality of the act were to be determined by its particular form. No doubt the diversion usually called by the name of "round dance" has its dangers, but it cannot be said that these are limited to one particular form of dancing, an exercise which to many presents no suggestion of sin whatever.

An act which is essentially an occasion of sin is always forbidden, because it is the first step in the commission of sin. There need be no law against such acts. When the Church legislates prohibiting certain practices, it is usually because of the danger, more or less direct, to which such practices lead, although in themselves they may be quite indifferent. Where a law is exclusive and permits no discretion of interpretation it is binding, independently of the reason which gave rise to the law and which makes it applicable only in certain cases. Thus, Catholics are forbidden to join any secret societies, although there are undoubtedly many secret societies whose aims and methods are without reproach; but since they are secret it is difficult to determine the particular character of any one, and hence, to avoid all danger, Catholics are warned by positive law against a league which may at any time become a menace to their faith and a hindrance to their liberty of conscience. The same may be said of our attitude towards the public schools. There are many individual schools to which a Catholic child might go without any danger to its religious education; yet if we were to admit the principle of public schools being sufficient for the education of our children, we would many times see ourselves forced to accept for our young the teaching of opinions opposed to us but against which we have no redress because our numbers are in the minority. Hence, the law of Bishops forbidding the children of Catholics to frequent the public schools where there are good parochial schools, is perfectly reasonable and binding, even if the Catholic school did not offer the same temporal or intellectual advantages as the other, so long as there is danger to the faith or moral life of the child frequenting the common school.

As to the subject of dances, the late Plenary Council of Baltimore prohibits as an abuse *charity balls* (convivia *cum choreis* ad opera pia promovenda).[1] It does not, to our knowledge, forbid "round dances" as particularly objectionable, but indicates that the social amusement of balls, of which as a rule, the round dance is a prominent feature, is a dangerous diversion which the Church does not wish to have employed as a means of procuring funds for the maintenance of her pious work.

On this ground the pastor has in his parish the right and duty to prevent such diversion when it is introduced by members of his flock as part of a programme in aid of the Church or any work connected with the same, such as would come under the name of *opera pia.*

But may he interdict round dances or any other kind of dances on the general plea of immorality?

Or, may he refuse absolution to a penitent who practices round dances or who gives parties of which these dances form a special feature?

To give a direct answer to these questions we would say: No.

But in saying "no," all has not been said. There are dances which are in their very nature immoral. These are unquestionably sins. There are dances which are mere expressions of joy and which, though the possible occasion of sin, may be performed quite innocently, as any other merry exercise of body. There is no reason, on the part of the priest, for speaking of either in public. Those who indulge in the former know that it is wrong, those who practice the latter may be warned of the danger, if danger there be in their particular case, in the confessional.

In exceptional instances a pastor may be justified in branding in detail the corrupting usages of his locality, but as a rule it does more harm than good to dilate on a subject the foul excesses of which are known to few and of which a priest is supposed to know only what he has never seen.

As to the confessional, the same duty of correcting and

1 Conc. Pl. III, n. 290.

punishing the errant member of the flock, devolves upon the confessor as in other cases of sin or proximate occasion thereto. He justly and wisely refuses absolution to a person who commits sin by dancing, and yet is unwilling to give up the practice which involves danger to his or her eternal salvation.

But we have so far spoken of publicly interdicting the practice on the ground of its being immoral and of refusing absolution to those who take part in the diversion of round dances.

If the custom of dances cannot be called indiscriminately immoral, it may as a rule be called *dangerous*. And on this ground we may always warn our people, especially the younger portion, against it.

For the individual we can say but little. To some their inborn vivacity supplies in the dance sufficient excitement to drown every other feeling and make the dance a healthy exercise, never approaching to baser passion. We speak, of course, of dances in which both sexes join. With others their national habits supply them with similar motives from which a vicious tendency is altogether absent, despite apparent familiarity. Much the same may be said of those social diversions in higher society which are entirely open and participated in by men and women who are above reproach. The objects which commonly excite the passions are not the same with persons who live under the restraints imposed by refined society as with the vulgar, whose manner more quickly oversteps the barrier of propriety.

Nevertheless it may be safely asserted that with us in the United States the practice of dancing is full of danger, and a pastor cannot sufficiently warn his people, especially the young, against the habit or the occasions which may invite it. In this connection we will be permitted to quote at length from the pastoral instruction of a Bishop whose long and varied experience on the mission in this country had taught him the danger of a practice which he used all his zeal to abolish from his fold. He says:

"In relation to balls and dances, we recommend watchfulness. The Holy Ghost warns against associating with those who frequent such. "Use not the company of her that is a dancer, lest thou

perish" (Ecclesiastic, ix, 4). St. Basil commenting on this subject says: "Young women who love to dance will lose the fear of God and set aside the torments of hell." . . . "The dance," says St. Charles Borromeo, "is a skillful invention for corrupting morals; it is the source of evil thoughts, impure expressions, of adultery, of the most shameful acts of impurity, quarrels and murders; it turns many persons away from their religious duties, from prayer, devout reading, and makes them heedless of the instructions which they stand so much in need of." (Act. Eccl. Mediol.) · · It is objected by some that St. Francis of Sales tolerated and even favored balls and dancing on certain occasions. To this we answer, that St. Francis of Sales, like all other saints and divines, could only then tolerate and favor balls and dancing when such were the lesser of two evils, both of which could not well be avoided at the same time; or at least, when they were devoid of sinful surroundings. Now, under these circumstances we would allow them as well as St. Francis of Sales. But with the Saint we hold that they are seldom free from sinful circumstances, that they are extremely dangerous, and therefore not to be encouraged, yes, to be condemned. Listen to the words of St. Francis of Sales to which also we subscribe: "Although balls and dancing be recreations which of their own nature are indifferent, yet, on account of the manner in which they are generally conducted they preponderate very much on the side of evil, and are consequently extremely dangerous." Again speaking of balls and dances he says: "O Philothea, these idle recreations are ordinarily very dangerous; they extinguish the spirit of devotion and leave the soul in a languishing condition; they cool off the fervor of charity and excite a thousand evil affections in the soul." Compared with good works, he calls balls and dances "criminal fooleries." (Introduction to a Devout Life, P. iii, c. 33.)

In this we have been confirmed by facts, for we find that in the parts of our diocese where balls and dances are of frequent occurrence, whilst ignorance, vulgarity, spiritual sloth, religious indifference, infidelity, and other, to the eyes of the world, perhaps more degrading evils are on the increase, faith and morals are on the decline; Sundays and holidays are profaned, the churches forsaken, the religious education of the youth, the reception of the sacraments and prayer almost entirely neglected; Christianity is despised, its ministers are disrespected and their admonitions unheeded, so that, on account of the deplorable condition to which the people of these

missions have been reduced, we find it very difficult to induce worthy clergymen to remain amongst them for any length of time.

Nowhere are mixed marriages, and marriages performed by squires, and marriages invalidly contracted, more frequent than in such communities.

Hence we call upon you, pastors of souls, to bring your influence to bear against these and all other amusements which you know to be a cause of scandal and the occasions of ruin to the souls entrusted to your care. And lest these dances and balls, which on account of the circumstances almost invariably connected with them, seldom escape being the proximate occasion of scandal and sin, should appear to receive the sanction of the Church and the approval of her authorities by allowing them to appear on holy ground, we must, to be consistent, forbid, and do forbid balls and dances to be gotten up in our diocese by, or in the name of, or for the benefit of Catholic churches, schools, or school-houses, religious communities, confraternities, and societies. Further, we forbid the clergy of our diocese, under pain of suspension, to accept of the moneys, or any part of the moneys, made at or by the occasion of such balls and dances, either for themselves or for any religious, eleemosynary, educational, or other purposes whatsoever. For we firmly believe that moneys raised by such means will draw after them, not God's blessing, but His malediction. (Pastoral Instruction of the Bishop of Alton, April 12, 1875.)

There is sound theology in this. There is no precept forbidding dances, or round dances in particular. The Fathers of the Council make, it is true, mention of these dances, and point out what a danger there lurks in the practice; but what they censure expressly is "choreas immodestas," which are, of course, to be condemned, as all other sinful customs. Moralists in general inveigh against "masked balls," because they offer greater danger to innocence; but the rule which they lay down for correcting the evils resulting from the practice of dancing is the one we have proposed above, or, in the words of P. Sabetti: *Generatim loquendo non expedit publice in prædicatione choreas aliquas nominatim reprehendere, quia concionator nihil proficeret, imo forte aliquos ad eas alliceret. Expedit potius indirecte agere in choreas, et directe in peccata quæ ex iis committi solent.*[1]

1 Theol. Mor. Tr. V, C. iii, 191, 5.

To some persons the practice of dancing would always be an occasion of sin, and their duty is plainly to accept the injunction of their confessors to avoid such amusement altogether. It is, perhaps, one of the most difficult things for a young girl to renounce this habit, once it has been cultivated. Like the disease called *tarantismus*, it takes possession of persons, especially girls, and makes them sacrifice health and every other consideration to the indulgence of a pleasure which becomes a sort of nervous affection, roused into abnormal action by the mere sound of music or rythmic motion.

The mediæval reformers of morals invented a manner of counteracting the feverish tendency fostered by the troubadours, who, returning from the East, brought with them the Oriental frivolities. Pictures and spectacles in which Death led the dance toward the grave were exhibited and explained to the people. From the thirteenth to the eighteenth century the *Dance of Death*, or the Dance of the Dead, as it was sometimes called, played an important part in religious art, and later in letters. It had its effect and gave a serious turn to the reckless tide that followed upon the introduction of a new civilization after the crusades. Clergy and people were to be found portrayed in the long procession of those whom the grim skeleton of Death was moving forward to invite to the hideous dance, and none could escape the dread fascination of those hollow eyes, beckoning one after another to waltz toward the brink of the grave. The constant though disguised warning might be repeated at all times, with similar good effect, by serious words about the serious truths of life.

P. ARMINIO.

OUR BOYS; WHAT ARE WE DOING FOR THEM?

IN every well organized parish of any considerable size in this country, the religious and social instincts of the congregation are supplied with manifold outlets of activity through societies sufficiently diversified to meet the inclina-

tions of all. This is particularly true of city churches. Devotional, benevolent, educational, temperance and insurance societies flourish and bring forth admirable fruit among the men. Sodalities of various kinds help to preserve and stimulate the faith and virtue of our young women. The parochial school, or where its existence is not yet practicable, the Sunday school, shapes the young heart and mind in moulds of correct religious principles. In fact the entire line of defence against the inroads of infidelity and sinfulness seems strongly maintained; but while, in comparing our continued growth in strength with the manifest disintegration of the sects, we may take honorable pride in the possession of the principle that marks true progress, it would be folly not to admit at the same time the existence of weak spots in our safeguards here and there, which, as facts plainly prove, our enemy has discovered and taken advantage of.

We propose here briefly to point out one of these vulnerable spots and see how best we can repair and strengthen it. The period that elapses between the age of fifteen, when the average boy leaves school, and the attainment of his majority, is unquestionably a most important one in the formation of his character. During these years the imitative faculty, which is universally characteristic of childhood, becomes a dangerous element if unrestrained or not diverted into wholesome channels. Now it is a lamentable fact, the result presumably of our natural proneness to evil, that bad example is more readily followed than good, and, owing to the same inherent tendency, bad habits are more easily acquired and tenaciously adhered to than good ones. The early use of tobacco familiarly illustrates this inclination *in vetitum* among boys, and we know that the greater vices have a similar fascination and are proudly adopted by the boy who is physically almost a man in the same spirit of manhood mimicry. Habits of crime and carelessness among boys and young men are the logical consequence of this condition of things, and our reformatories and penal institutions contain emphatic evidence of youthful depravity, the result of uncontrolled boyhood. Besides these, what we may call extreme

cases, there is another class more numerous by far who go but seldom to Mass and never frequent the Sacraments, young men, too, who as boys in class room or Sunday school gave promise of unswerving fidelity to their religious duties ; but the guardians of their souls lost sight of them for a few precious years and when next they met them were surprised to discover that so many of them had drifted far away from the fold.

It will be urged that we, the clergy, are not responsible for this, that the parents are the natural guardians of the child, and by divine right and obligation should keep their boys in the paths of duty so clearly staked out for them by the Church; moreover, the good influences of home should form an efficient antidote to the contagious poison of bad example. But as a matter of fact parents are not always alive to this duty, which is more difficult in the case of boys than of girls, for whom the ordinary safeguards of home generally suffice as a check to evil tendencies. There are, of course, many homes the atmosphere of which developes steady and good habits in boys, who subsequently become good young men. But the average boy is exposed to other influences equally or more powerful than those of the home circle. The boy of the laborer as a rule finds his attraction outdoors, especially at evenings, and fortunate is he if he escape the pitfalls which await his steps on all sides. The street corner has its quota of worthless young hoodlums who fairly revel in "manly" vice and vulgarity ; the saloon, one of the Church's mightiest foes, opens its glistening doors—though unlawfully—eager to fill the places of those who are constantly falling from the dignity of customers to the degradation of victims ; the cheap and nasty theatre, conspicuously and immodestly advertised, abounding in immoral suggestiveness, attracts and corrupts him ; add to this a passion, not uncommon, for flashy and criminal literature and the road to ruin stretches alluringly before him.

Where are we, the clergy, with the many soul-saving appliances at our disposal, in behalf of these victims? Can we stand by, with folded arms, watching the downward proces-

sion of boys going to their ruin as they absorb the seeds of vice that permeate the atmosphere around them? It will not do to trust wholly to the moral strength that Christian education, and holy Mass, and the Sacraments have in the past supplied to destroy these pernicious germs, for evil is a ceaseless and a quick growth, especially in the youth. But what more can we do?

If it is an excellent thing to provide or encourage places where men can innocently or profitably spend an evening, such as the parish lyceums or society club rooms, and to establish also, where feasible, like institutions for young women; then a similar provision for the boy—who is father to the man—cannot be deemed less advantageous.

We venture to suggest that there should be in every parish large enough to afford it, some place where the boys, who will not spend their evenings at home (and often small blame to them for it), may congregate and occupy themselves harmlessly and pleasantly; a resort which will be an efficient counter-attraction to those places in which his morals would be in danger, where his natural buoyancy and love of amusement may find innocent scope in games, gymnastics, music, and light, clean reading, where, in short, the boy will be willingly kept under the protecting wing of Mother Church during these years which, perhaps, of his whole life are most fraught with danger.

There are, we know, parishes in which such provision is made for boys who have just left school. Readings and theatricals of a healthy and instructive character, drills, hours devoted to various branches of industrial training, relieved by games, music, and occasional out-door festivities, give interest and zest to the meetings and create an *esprit de corps* which rarely fails to do good service to the Church, not only in its parochial, but in its wider social relations.

But the subject deserves a larger share of attention than it actually receives, and it is with a view of eliciting discussion of it in the pages of the REVIEW that we have ventured to broach it here.

W. J. M.

CONFERENCES.

THE STIPEND ON ALL SOULS' DAY.

Qu. When Fr. C. was appointed to his present charge there was a purgatorial society which was established by his predecessors. He continues it for the first year, but afterwards, not caring to have a Mass every month for a year ahead, he abolishes it. This year, before All Souls' Day, he announces that, all persons giving in the names of deceased relatives and friends and making the usual offering, a special remembrance will be made in the Mass of the day, and a requiem high Mass offered on the Mondays of November. Offerings to the amount of $35.00 are received. Fr. C. knows what Sabetti says about the matter but still feels that he must say a separate Mass for the individual intentions of those who have given the customary offering.

Resp. The acceptance of the honorarium above described is legitimate, *provided* the manner in which the offering is applied in this case has been carefully explained to the people beforehand. The S. Congregation in sanctioning what it assumed to be an existing general custom in the United States, added the limitation: "*Only let there be a notice placed in the church explaining that for the offerings on that occasion one Mass is sung on All Souls' Day.*"

Unless this precaution is observed, there is evident danger of violating the general law of the Church in the matter of accepting stipends for a Mass.

The tenth of the propositions *condemned* by Pope Alexander VII reads: Non est contra justitiam pro pluribus sacrificiis stipendium accipere, et sacrificium unum offere."

In some places the diocesan statutes regulate this matter, making it understood that the practice is lawful only where the people are made perfectly aware of their offering being made for a *memento.* Merely to *request* the *customary* offering may give rise to the misapprehension that the usual

stipend given according to the local custom for saying a Mass is here intended. This is not the case.

To avoid all misapprehension which would burden a priest with injustice requiring subsequent restitution we must attend to the terms of the question proposed and of the answer made by the S. Congregation. The original Latin document will be found in the Analecta of this number.

The question was whether a custom, which had obtained in many dioceses of the United States, of receiving the contributions of the faithful on All-Souls' Day and applying them for one Mass, could be legitimately continued. Furthermore, whether the Ordinary may forbid the custom altogether or fix a definite honorarium for this Mass and have others said in proportion to the honorarium received.

The S. Congregation answered: *Nihil innovetur* and added the restriction to which we have referred above. It does not abolish the custom where it exists, but it gives no authority to introduce the custom where it did not exist before.

When the matter was discussed in the Roman Congregation which rendered the above decision, the following resolutions substantially were appended to the official declaration.

I. The sacred Canons forbid all methods savoring of avarice by which the faithful are importuned to contribute, against their will, alms for Masses.

II. Canon law admits no custom by which the offerings made for several Masses can be legitimately satisfied for by the celebration of one Mass (that is, if any one made his offering with the understanding that he will receive as many Masses as his stipend ordinarily represents, one Mass will not satisfy for the obligation accepted by the priest).

III. But where there is no deception or circumvention or misunderstanding on the part of those who make the offering, in such way that they give freely, knowing that they are making a voluntary offering for a single Mass which is applied to all, a priest may accept as a gift of generosity whatever the faithful offer on this occasion.

IV. The S. Congregation wishes to emphasize the condi-

tion that in the case of legitimate offerings the existing custom and the voluntary character on the part of the people making them is to be kept in view.

INVALID MARRIAGES AND THE CIVIL LAW.

Qu. Richard and Amelia, whose ages are about 21 and 17 respectively, leave their homes and go from their own State, where a marriage license is required by law, to M. in the State of H. where no license is required, are married by the squire and are given a certificate. They return home, and people, generally, believe they are married but do not know where or by whom. Shortly after, Richard comes to his pastor to find out about making his Easter duty. He tells him the circumstances of their marriage. The girl (a Protestant) is anxious and willing to become a Catholic, but on enquiring he finds that she has never been baptized. The pastor is in a quandary; he does not know whether he ought to get a license for them from their own State, for the non-compliance with which there is a fine of $100, before he settles the case or not. Finally he decides to act as quickly and quietly as possibly. He therefore baptizes the girl, receives her into the Church and marries them the same evening, making no register of the marriage but only of her baptism. The girl is to continue her instructions under the pastor until such time as she can be admitted to the sacraments, but in the mean time the couple move to another diocese. Can Fr. rest satisfied with the proceeding?

Resp. There appears to be no difficulty here. The State takes no cognizance of the sacramental character of the marriage rite, and hence considers the act as valid if the outward formalities prescribed are complied with. The party in obtaining a certificate from the squire, were married to all intents and purposes before the public and satisfied the civil conditions which qualified them as having legitimately assumed the responsibilities of married persons. The priest in not registering the marriage, to the subsequent validity of which he gave his testimony, so to speak, *in foro conscientiae*, merely took a precaution by which he avoided misapplication of the forms of law.

A QUESTION OF LOCAL JURISDICTION.

REV. AND DEAR SIR:

Will you kindly read over and give your opinion about the following:

Father John's parish borders on Fr. W's, which is in another diocese. Some eight or nine families who are land-owners have always made Fr. John's church their parish, for the reason that they are only four or five miles from his church, whereas they are twelve, thirteen and more miles from Fr. W's, their parish proper. For the same reason some renters, living nearer to Fr. John's church, always go there.

Fr. J. When first assigned to his parish has an interview with his neighbor, who tells him that he will see his Bishop and get the necessary faculties for him.

Shortly after he comes to Fr. J. and tells him that he has seen the Bishop, and that he has now permission to attend them in sickness, baptize their children, etc.; but not all in his parish—only those few (meaning certain families whose names were given him by Fr. John's predecessor). Shortly after he tells him that his jurisdiction was limited to two or three. In the meantime, however, Fr. J. sees his own Bishop and tells him about the matter. The Bishop says "that Fr. William's Bishop's meaning was to give you jurisdiction over all those around your parish." Fr. J. acts on this ever after. A young man who has since moved near Fr. J's church (3 miles—14 miles from Fr. W's) comes with a child to be baptized. Fr. John is a little scrupulous and hesitates at first, but finally consents and baptizes the child. Can he rest content and retain the offerings?

Resp. Fr. J. need have no scruples. His Bishop has given him the common sense view of the matter.

STATUES IN THE MIDDLE OF THE ALTAR.

Qu. Is it proper to place a very small crucifix over the high altar and a large statue of the Blessed Virgin or St. Joseph in the most conspicuous position between the candle-sticks?

Resp. No, the crucifix should occupy the most conspicuous place in the immediate centre of the altar and be so large

as to be easily seen by the congregation. The use of small crucifixes placed on the tabernacle has been expressly prohibited by decree of the S. Congregation of Rites (Sept. 17, 1822). "Parva crux cum imagine Crucifixi posita super tabernaculum non est sufficiens in missa, sed poni debet alia crux in medio candelabrorum. . . . Abusum collocandi parvam crucem vix visibilem vel supra tabernaculum, vel supra aliquam minorem tabulam in medio altaris sitam reprobavit S. R. C. (Manuale Sacerdotum P. II. p. 90 nota.)

In the same sense we have a decree forbidding the custom of placing pictures, statues, or relics, on the tabernacle in which the Blessed Sacrament is kept. This applies in most cases to the high altar. "Toleranda non est, sed tamquam abusus eliminanda consuetudo superimponendi Sanctorum reliquias, pictasque imagines tabernaculo in quo augustissimum Sacramentum asservatur." (Adone, III, 65.) The altar represents Calvary upon which the principal figure is the Crucifix. "Ab aspectu crucis sacerdoti celebranti passio Christi in memoriam revocatur, cujus passionis viva imago et realis repraesentatio hoc sacrificium est." (Bona, Rer. liturg. I, 25 n. 8.)

CONFORMITY IN THE CELEBRATION OF MASS.

Qu. I. If a religious is rector of a diocesan parish can he follow his own *Ordo?* And if so what rule are visiting priests to observe in regard to color and other rubrical requisites?

II. When there are priests who follow different *Ordos* saying Mass in a church or diocese which follows one particular *Ordo*, what rules are those priests to observe whose *Ordo* prescribes the celebration of feasts different from those prescribed in the diocese, especially what rules must they observe in regard to conformity of color?

Resp. As a general rule a rector of a diocesan parish who is a religious follows his own *Ordo*. The diocesan *Ordo* is to be followed on feasts when he says Mass for the congregation and in solemn and public functions. A visiting priest follows the *Ordo* of the church in which he celebrates; *a.* when a solemn feast is celebrated in the church; *b*, when the color

of the office of the church differs from his own. In all other cases he retains his own *Ordo* both as to the character of the feast and as to the color.

The same general principle holds good for the second question.

J. McC.

THE PREFACE OF THE MISSA VOTIVA SS. CORDIS.

Qu. In the June number (1890) of the REVIEW, p. 405, it is stated that the Preface to be said in the Votive Mass of the S. Heart, on the first Friday of the month is: *De Nativitate*, except from Septuagesima to Pentecost, when it is *De Cruce*; on p. 404 I find that the Mass to be said is *Miserebitur* found in the "Proprium Sanctorum."

I have before me a Missal from which I copy: *Praefatio de Cruce: Sequens Praefatio dicitur in . . . et in festis SS. Cordis.*

In the "Proprium Sanctorum" the Mass which begins with the *Miserebitur* introduces a rubric regarding votive Masses, but when it comes to the Preface it simply says: *Praefatio de Cruce.*

The corresponding Mass in the appendix of the Missal, beginning *Egredimini*, contains the rubric: *Praefatio de Nativitate Domini. Et sic dicitur etiam in Missis votivis a Dominica Trinitatis usque ad Septuagesimam. A Septuagesima vero usque ad Pentecosten, Praefatio de Cruce.*

From this it seems that the preface to be said all the year round is the *De Cruce*, except in places where the Mass *Egredimini* is allowed. Otherwise it should have been indicated in the Mass *Miserebitur*, where provision is made for the votive Mass in regard to the *graduale.*

I request you to have the kindness to answer this difficulty in the REVIEW.

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Resp. By decree of May 9, 1885, the "Missa SS. Cordis Jesu" has been classed among those Masses which may be generally celebrated as votive Masses. This includes *both* Masses inserted in the Missal, *i.e.*, the one beginning *Miserebitur* in the "Proprium Sanctorum," and the other beginning *Egredimini.* Such is the sense in which the privilege has been commonly understood by liturgists.

A doubt on this subject having been sent to the *Ephemerides Liturgicae*, "Missa *Miserebitur* concessa fuit uti votiva: idem privilegium complectiturne etiam alteram missam *Egredimini*?" the answer was: "Affirmative; quia ita privilegium intelligendum est, ut Missa festiva de SS. Corde approbata sit ut votiva. Hinc auctores liturgici inter unam et aliam non distinguunt, sed docent Missam propriam de SS. Corde recitari posse ut votivam." (Ephem. Liturg. vol. iv, p. 209.)

It is but natural, therefore, to conclude according to the general rubric, which prescribes for the votive Masses the *Praefatio Propria* whenever there is such, that the distinction indicated in the Mass *Egredimini* should prevail. As the rubric of the Mass *Miseremini* does not make mention of the two Prefaces according to the different seasons of the year, it would certainly be in accordance with the Mass-formulary to recite the Preface *De Cruce* all the year round, until the S. Congregation authorizes the addition of a rubric similar to that given in the Mass *Egredimini*, from which latter the Gradual, Tract and Versicles are taken for the votive Mass *Miseremini*, when this Mass is said after Septuagesima. Perhaps the next edition of the *Editio Typica* will make this clearer.

The following are the rubrics regarding the votive Mass of the S. Heart as given by P. Schober, the editor of the *Typica Editio* of the Roman Missal.

"In Introitu *Miserebitur* extra tempus paschale omittitur utrumque *Alleluja*, et post Septuagesimam et tempore paschali Tractus et Alleluja cum V.V. sumendum est ex altera Missa *Egredimini*.

"Missa votiva SS. Cordis Jesu, cujus Introitus incipit *Miserebitur* habet Praefationem de Cruce; in altera autem cum Introitu *Egredimini* dicitur Praefatio de Nativitate Domini a Dominica Trinitatis usque ad Septuagesimam; a Septuagesima vero usque ad Pentecosten Praefatio de Cruce juxta specialem Missalis dispositionem pro hac Missa." *Ceremon. Missae* pp. 238 and 243.

In an excellent little compendium of rubrics written by a

member of the same congregation to which the reverend editor of the *Editio Typica* belongs, we find the following regarding the *Missa SS. Cordis votiva:* Dicitur cum *Gloria* et *Credo*, unica Oratione . . Praefatio *De Nativitate*, a Dom. Trinitatis usque ad Septuag., vero usque ad Pentecosten Praefatio *De Cruce* dicitur. ("Collectio Rerum Liturgicarum." Jos. Wuest. C. SS. R. Benziger Bro.)

The general rubrics would certainly sanction the above, both for the Mass *Miserebitur* as for that contained in the Appendix of the Missal; but so long as it is not stated in the special rubric of the former it cannot be said to be a law. We are not aware that the S. Congregation has decided anything on the subject.

THE PROHIBITION OF ROUND DANCES.

Qu. Would you kindly through the REVIEW answer the following questions:

a. Can a priest absolutely forbid round dances in his parish when he clearly sees the evil consequences following from them? Even supposing that the Bishop of the diocese has said nothing on the subject.

b. What is the general rule followed in our principal dioceses and parishes?

A. C. B.

Resp. An approved moral theologian writes: "Generatim loquendo *non expedit publice* in praedicatione choreas aliquas *nominatim reprehendere.*" (Sabetti: Theol. Moral. n. 191.) The author adds: It is preferable to preach against the sins which result from the habit of dancing and thus *indirectly* to condemn the practice. This, we believe, is the manner in which pastors generally deal with the subject. For the rest a more exhaustive answer to this query is given in the paper entitled "The Morality of Round Dances" found in the present number.

ANALECTA.

SUPER ELEEMOSYNIS MISSARUM IN DIE II NOVEMBRIS.

Die 13 Maii 1876 et 27 Jan. 1877.

Acta S. Sedis Vol. X, p. 120.

Reverendissimus Episc. R. in America ad-Emum Praefectum S. Congregationis de Propaganda Fide epistolam misit sequentis tenoris :

"In plurimis Foederatorum Statuum Americae Sept. Dioecesibus et etiam in hac mea invaluit consuetudo ut, pro unica missa quae in die Commemorationis omnium Fidelium Defunctorum cantatur, Fideles contribuant pecuniam. Summa autem pecuniae sic collecta ordinaria tanta est ut plurium centenarum Missarum eleemosynas facile exaequet. Inter eos qui pecuniam hoc modo contribuant, plurimi sunt de quibus dubitari merito possit, utrum eam hoc modo collaturi forent si rite edocerentur animabus Purgatorii, quas sic juvare intendunt, melius provisum iri, si tot missae pro iis, licet extra diem Commemorationis omnium Fidelium Defunctorum celebrarentur, quot juxta taxam dioecesanam continentur stipendia in summa totali sic contributa.

Ut erroneæ Fidelium opinioni occurratur in quibusdam diocesibus Statuto Synodali cautum est, ut, nisi singulis annis prævia diligens totius rei explicatio populo fiat, missionariis eam Fidelium pecuniam pro unica illa missa accipere non liceat.

Quare Eminentiam Vestram enixe ac humillime precor ut pro pace conscientiae meae ad dubia sequentia respondere dignetur.

1.—Utrum prædicta consuetudo absolute prohibenda sit. Quod si *negative:*

2.—Utrum tolerari possit, casu quo quotannis prævia illa diligens totius rei explicatio populo fiat. Quod si *affirmative:*

3.—Utrum, si timor sit ne vel missionarii præviam illam diligentem eamque plenam totius rei explicationem populo praebeant, vel populus eam satis intelligat, Ordinarius istam consuetudinem prohibere possit et missionariis injungere ut pro tota summa contributa intra ipsum mensem Novembris tot legantur vel cantentur missae quot in ea continentur stipendia, pro missis sive lectis sive cantatis. Quod si *affirmative:*

4.—Utrum ob rationem quod missae illae intra ipsum mensem Novembris legendae vel cantandae sint, Ordinarius consuetum Missarum sive legendarum sive cantandarum stipendium pro aequo suo arbitrio pro illis missis possit augere.

Quaestio haec ab Emo. Praefecto S. C. de Propaganda Fide ad S. Concilii Congregationem resolvenda remissa fuit.

Sacra Concilii Congregatio causa discussa sub die 13 Maii, 1876, respondere censuit: *Dilata et exquiratur votum consultoris.*

Sub die vero 27 Januarii, 1877, eadem S. C. Congr. audito Consultoris voto sequens dabat responsum:

Nihil innovetur: tantum apponatur tabella in Ecclesia qua fideles doceantur quod illis ipsis eleemosynis una canitur missa in die Commemorationis omnium Fidelium defunctorum.

Ex quibus colliges

I.—Per sacros Canones prohiberi quoad eleemosynas missarum quidquid ad avaritiam pertinet, quodque turpe sapiat quaestum, ceu sunt importunae atque illiberales eleemosynarum exactiones.

II.—Proinde a jure canonico haud consuetudinem admitti ullam, qua fieret ut pro pluribus eleemosynis una tantum applicaretur missa: nequit enim sacerdos ull moodo una tantum missa satisfacere pro pluribus pro quibus promisit *specialiter et in solidum* celebrare.

III.—Etenim quamvis sacrificium missae sit virtutis infinitae, tamen Christus qui est idem sacrificium, non operatur summam suae immensitatis plenitudinem, sed in ejusmodi mysteriis operatur certa distributione suae plenitudinis lege infallibili eisdem alligata.

IV.—Verumtamen licere Sacerdoti cuique plures accipere eleemosynas pro unica missa, quoties id noverint offerentes; cum enim dolus et circumventio absint omne pactum inter sacerdotem et offerentes haberi debet licitum atque justum.

V.—Illos namque qui singuli integra offerant stipendia, et contenti sint ut pro seipsis omnibus una applicetur missa, perinde agere ac si ex mera liberalitate pinguem elargirentur eleemosynam.

VI.—Consuetudinem in themate haud reprobari potuisse dum offerentibus innotesceret, neque dici possit eosdem invitos stipendia quam plurima praebere pro unica missa litanda in die commemorationis omnium Fidelium defunctorum.

VII.—Maximam insuper a S. Rota firmatam fuisse; quod in materia oblationum legitima attendenda sit locorum consuetudo, et mens seu voluntas offerentium.

EPISTOLA AD EPISCOPOS DE JUBILAEO LEONIS XIII.

ILLME AC RME DOMINE.

Quae vota pro summi Ecclesiae Antistitis incolumitate, abhinc quinque annis, Deo conservatori obtulimus, propediem impleta

laetaturi sumus, anno apperiente quinquagesimo, ex quo ipse, florenti adhuc aetate, episcopus rite inunctus est. Adventantis gaudii signa iam emicant, filiorum quasi certamine ubique terrarum excitato, ad Parentis augusti solemnia alacriter peragenda.

Verum tantae faustitatis celebrandae ratio ea esse debet, quae post effusam erga Illum debitam filiorum liberalitatem, caetera omnium studia, Apostolicae Sedis decori amplificando, iuventuti ad christianam sapientiam colendae, iuvandae egenorum inopiae, tutandae fidei, catholico nomini quam latissime propagando, quantum fuerint uniuscuiusque vires, devoveat.

Itaque cum Beatissimus Pater, optatis annuens Coetus solemnia ipsa curantis, me, pro benignitate sua, honorarium eiusdem Coetus Praesidem appellaverit, quod mihi, utpote Sanctissimi Domini Vicario, accidit iucundissime ; enixe Te rogo, Reverendissime Domine, ut qua praestas solertia et pietate, ea omnia praesidia adhibeas, quibus exoriens faustitas, anteactae splendorem nobilissime referat. Nova enim, eaque insignia, quae in Ecclesiam et civilem societatem sapientissimus Pontifex sibi merita adiunxit, omnino poscunt, ut grati et fideles catholicorum animi erga supremum Ducem, vel agmini adverso, eo amplius patescant.

Quoniam vero isthinc frequenter fortasse ad Urbem anno proximo erunt peregre adventuri, ideo exopto ab Amplitudine Tua, ut quidquid a Nobis (me revera cum Coetu optime de re merito habeas coniunctissimum) exigendum putes, quod ad sacras peregrinationes tempestive aggrediendas, perficiendasque feliciter spectet, Nos ipsos de hisce similibusque rebus roges liberrime et consules.

Collatis omnes propositis viribusque adlaboremus, ut quem memorabilem exitum, favente Deo, quinquagenaria sacerdotii celebritas communi Parenti attulit, eundem afferat atque cumulet episcopatus celebritas optatissima.

Quod propitio Dei numine impetraturos esse confidimus, dum Tibi fausta omnia ex animo adprecamur.

Amplitudinis Tuae,
addictissimus uti frater
LUCIDUS MARIA *Cardinalis* PAROCCHI.

Romae, XI cal. decembres anno MDCCCLXXXXII, anniversaria die Praesentationis Deiparae.

DE CULTU VULTUS SANCTI.

DUBIA.

Dubium I. Utrum approbari vel saltem permitti conveniat specialem cultum Vultui adorabili Divini Redemptoris, et ab illo consueto usque adhuc Sancti Vultus imagini tributo, diversis a Sacerdotibus a Sancto Vultu (Sainte Face) dictis, Turonibus institutis, maximopere propagatum per annales relativae Archisodalitatis?

Dubium II. Utrum ad propagandum stabiliendumve cultum, de quo in altero quaesito, Ecclesiam aut publicum Oratorium dedicari, Sodalitates ac etiam aliquam religiosam Congregationem vel Institutum sub titulo Sancti Vultus fundari conveniat?

Eminentissimi ac Reverendissimi Domini Cardinales in rebus fidei et morum generales Inquisitores, re mature perpensa, respondendum mandarunt?

Ad Dubium I. *Non expedire*.

Ad Dubium II. *Negative; et ad mentem.*

Mens est: Sancta Sedes titulum adoptans *Santi Vultus*, tum in BREVI diei 16 Decembris 1884, speciales indulgentias Sodalitati sub tali titulo Turonibus erectae concedente, tum in BREVI diei 30 Martii 1885, Sodalitatem ad Archisodalitatis gradum elevante, favere minime intellexit, multoque minus sive directe, sive indirecte approbationem dare speciali distinctoque cultui, adorabili Vultui Redemptoris tribuendo, eo modo, quo Presbyteris a *Vultu Sancto* dictis speciatim proponitur atque propagatur.

Sancta Sedes unice venerationi favere intellexit, iam ab antiquis temporibus erga imaginem Vultus Divini Redemptoris, aut eiusdem imaginis exemplaria habitae; ut in fidelium mentibus, ex veneratione contemplationeque praedictae imaginis, passionum Christi magis in dies memoria succrescat, eorumque in cordibus dolor culparum, ardensque desiderium iniuriis Divinae Maiestati illatis reparandi, augeantur.

Sequenti vero feria V, facta de his Sanctissimo D. N. Leoni PP. XIII relatione in audientia R. P. D. Assessori S. Officii impertita, eadem Sanctitas Sua Eminentissimorum Patrum resolutionem approbare dignata est.

BOOK REVIEW.

A CHRISTIAN APOLOGY. By Paul Schanz, D.D., D.Ph. Translated by Rev. Michael F. Glancey and Rev. Victor J. Schobel, D.D. Vol. III. The Church.—New York and Cincinnati: Fr. Pustet & Co. 1892.

In the study of apologetics as a distinct branch of Catholic theology the *nodus* of every question is solved by a correct estimate of the position and function of the Church in matters of doctrine and discipline. Divine revelation is to the Church what the *materia prima* is with the scholastics to the *forma substantialis*. We cannot hope to understand, much less to assimilate as an active influence, the former without a clear perception of the latter.

To facilitate this perception is, indeed, the purpose of apologetics on the whole, and that part of the science which treats of the Church in particular. Hence the importance of the subject contained in the volume before us.

The manner of treatment adopted by the author in his treatise brings out this fact in all its prominence, although he leads us up to it by what has been called the historical method in theology.

The entire body of revealed truths contained in the Old Testament reaches its fulfillment, and, hence, its ultimate purpose in Christ. He is the one fact predicted from all time and for all time. The advent of the Holy Ghost is not a new revelation, but only the completion of the advent of Christ, and for the purpose of enlightening mankind concerning that advent and its full scope.

This gives us at once a view of the practical function of the Church in which the Holy Ghost dwells, and whence He, by His divine light, continually perfects our understanding of Christ's mission on earth. The Christian revelation, therefore, although materially absolute and perfect, does not exclude formal perfectibility. The Church is a living organism with vital energy capable of development as of expansion.

Our author shows how this principle of development and progress was recognized from the beginning by the Apostles, and subsequently by the Fathers of the Church. He proves that the contents of the original divine deposit of faith require unfolding at the hand of a living, intelligent agent who serves as the instrument

of the Holy Ghost for the accomplishment of all the purposes of redemption, and the full restoration of the first purpose of creation. In this respect he contrasts the Church with the numerous other organisms which claim to hold the deposit of Christian revelation, and shows how barren they are of the real Christian life that bears witness to the indwelling of the Holy Ghost.

From this basis the "Kingdom of God" on earth is surveyed, its component elements examined, tested, and its authoritative solidity illustrated. Apart from this the structures of the artificial churches, before, during and since the Reformation so-called are studied with a full appreciation of their historical and moral claims.

Having shown how, whilst grace and truth are destined for all men, the individual is reached by the divine revelation directly through the Church with her infallible primacy of jurisdiction, Dr. Schanz treats in a final chapter of the Church and Civilization, in which he shows by irrefutable testimony of facts how Christianity is not only the sole force capable of producing the highest kind of all-sided civilization, but also how her influence has actually produced the good which we may acknowledge in progress, and how every retarding or marring influence has come from the opposite direction.

The Translators who, as we intimated on a previous occasion in reviewing a former volume of this work, have done their task with the intelligence and care demanded for it, showed their practical judgment in adding the two appendices which greatly enhance the value of this book for English readers. The first is an exposition of the Anglican view or line of argument regarding the Primacy of the Pope. It is taken from a paper by Professor Bright (Oxon.) and puts the Catholic reader in possession of certain prejudiced views which he must take into account when proposing the argument of our author for the benefit of those non-Catholics for whom it is principally intended. The second consists of three papers intended to throw light on the movement toward religious union of the different Christian sects and containing both an appeal to Catholics from a representative Protestant body as also a letter in reply by the late Cardinal Manning. The subject is being broached even now in this country and hence the practical advantage of the chapter in question.

We regret the necessity which forced the English editors to omit the Index. The two *errata corrige* in the beginning are simply repetitions of two other errors, as will be easily seen by reference to the places cited.

LE DROIT SOCIAL DE L'ÉGLISE et ses applications dans les circonstances présentes. Par P—Ch. M. Docteur en Droit.—Paris: L. Larose et Forcel.—V. Retaux et Fils.

The practical difficulties which arise out of a misunderstanding of the true and just relation between Church and State can be removed only by a serious study of the fundamental principles which establish the separate right on both sides of the contention. This is not all that is necessary to pave the way for the harmonious activity of two societies of which God intended that they should complement each other, and by their union secure man's complete social happiness on earth—but it is a great deal and without such previous understanding of principles, all attempts at a practical adjustment are futile and can only tend to increase the difficulties by heightening the animosities which arise from the mutual agressiveness.

The author of the volume under review takes for his text the sentiment enunciated by Leo XIII in his encyclical on the duties of Christians, namely, that it behooves us in these days of negation and violence done to the rights of religion, to assert those rights boldly and without circumlocution.

Truths advanced in half-measure, he says, have never done any good in the defence of right. Men are swayed by principles, not by expedients. The condition of the Church in France is a sad example of this. Liberal Catholicism has ended by becoming a mockery of the adversaries whom it pretended to combat.

This is drawn out in the introductory remarks under the title of *Considérations Générales*, which are not without a touch of magnificent enthusiasm, and show the author to be an earnest combatant against compromises with irreligion whether in the social or civil order. It would certainly be interesting could we here reproduce this introduction written in a brilliant and incisive style.

But the writer is not a mere enthusiast. He knows how to apply the maxim of Dr. Maistre, who wanted Catholics not only to reason with their adversaries, but to overcome them by reasoning better than they.

He gives a clear and well grouped exposition of the fundamental notions of right, its origin and different application; of the individual as a person; of society, the elements which compose it and of its highest form. In the second part he examines the nature of

civil society, as necessary and as the expression of the divine Will. He determines the source and character of civil authority, and thence passes to the different forms of government, dwelling in particular on the legitimacy of the present actual rule of France. Correlative with this he treats of the Church as a necessary society, establishes her rights as the perfection of society, and incidentally refutes the current and plausible objections against the assertion of these rights.

The third part, which is in many respects the most important of the work, especially in the first portion, establishes the principles of a just relation between Church and State, sifts the merits of Concordats, and sets forth the obligations which arise out of the mutual agreements between the Pontiffs and civil rulers.

The last part lights up the advantages which the State must derive from a proper adjustment of its relations to the Church, for the preservation of civil peace. This relation is one of duty toward a higher society.

After this the author reviews in turn the false notions represented by Indifferentism, Naturalism and Liberalism. There is a telling chapter on liberal Catholicism and its effects, which might serve as a wholesome lesson in philosophy to not a few American Catholic journalists. But we may have occasion to digest it later on for those who care to read. As for the method in which the subject is set forth it could not be more attractive considering the quasi-didactic character of the matter. The author has an elevated style drawn from the reading of the great masters of Catholic thought, S. Augustine, S. Thomas, Suarez, not to mention others more recent, and he shows a keen appreciation of the purpose of Leo XIII and his predecessors, as traced in those unequaled encyclicals, *Mirari vos*, *Quanta Cura*, *Diuturnum* and *Immortale Dei*.

It were well if this work found at once a good translator. As it is, we shall not fail to come back to it, in one form or other, in the REVIEW.

SOUND AND MUSIC. By Rev. J. Zahm, C.S.C., Professor of Physics in the University of Notre Dame. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co. 1892.

From many points of view this latest contribution to the literature of science must be considered alike interesting and important. It deals with a subject which, like its vibratory kindred, light and heat, possesses an intense attractiveness for the scientific mind,

and which, like them, still is yielding to patient investigation the delights of new conquests. Presenting the latest results of such experimentation in a clear, forcible and popular style, it recommends itself not alone to collegiate study, but as well to the perusal of the larger university outside of college walls—the thinking and cultured classes who are every year finding an increased zest in following the developments of scientific theory. But while it must prove a pleasant and popular—albeit a strictly scientific—presentation of the theory of sound, and will thus find a ready acceptance among those who study sound merely as one of the classes of physical phenomena, the author has had in special view the interests of those who consider the subject of sound from another standpoint, viz., as the material of music. "The main purpose of this book"—says its author—"is to give musicians and general readers an exact knowledge, based on experiment, of the principles of acoustics, and to present at the same time a brief exposition of the physical basis of musical harmony. Both in Europe and in this country musical conservatories are beginning to exact of students a theoretical as well as a practical knowledge of music." Besides being a sufficiently full exposition of the theory of sound this work discusses, as a principal subject of inquiry, the intimate relationships existing between the vibrations of elastic bodies, appreciated by the ear as sound, and their *consecutive* or *simultaneous* occurrence appreciated by the soul as *melody* or *harmony*.

The title of this book has been happily chosen. It is a treatise on the theory of sound, and furnishes its readers with the latest results of experimentation in this delightful field of scientific research: it does not stop here, however, but trenches so far upon the realm of the aesthetic as to indicate the many close relationships between the pleasurable sensations derived from "Music," and the present day theory concerning the nature of sound. "Sound and Music" indicates with sufficient completeness and distinctness, and in the smallest compass, the scope of the work. And the title is also happily significant of the fact, that until very lately, the two subjects have received too separate a treatment from the pens of acousticians and musicians. Tyndall's classical work on sound enters somewhat into the relations of these cognate subjects, as, indeed, do the more advanced works on general physics, such as Ganot's; and Blaserna, in his "Theory of Sound in its relation to Music," follows the example of Helmholtz in his great work "Die Lehre von den Tonempfindungen," and devotes his energies to a joint

discussion of these subjects. But Blaserna's treatment is meagre in comparison to Father Zahm's, and, however interesting—and Blasernas writes charmingly—must give place to the equally interesting and more exhaustive work of Notre Dame's learned Professor.

We need hardly draw attention to the evident gain resulting to the science of music from such a joint discussion. And however much the art of music lies above and beyond the dicta of the science of music—as far beyond as genius, inspiration, poetry, transcend the pen of the plodding advances of reason, mathematical formulae and rules of grammar and rhetoric—still the musician has much to learn from the patient and laborious delver into the hidden mines of acoustical phenomena. The scientific cast of the times will scarce tolerate the charlatanry of a blind empiricism. The musician must be educated to meet the demands of the times. Godfrey Weber's fierce denunciation of the endless theorizing of his day concerning the physical basis of harmony, becomes intelligible, and receives ample vindication in the light of subsequent discoveries. For that accomplished pioneer in the wildernesses of latter-day, theoretical harmony, lived before the recent era of the investigations of Helmholtz, Koenig and Mayer. And while it may still be true, to quote his words, that "one may be the profoundest musical composer, the greatest contra-puntist . . . without knowing that a tone is to its fifth as 2 to 3," yet a becoming knowledge of the "why" of musical beauty—a reason not couched wholly in the vague dicta of emotional subjectivism—is properly expected from anyone who in such an age as this devotes the energies of a lifetime to the special department of musical culture. Imagination does not yield any of its just prerogatives because Reason seeks to prove a natural title to such prerogatives. In bringing the heavens nearer to us, the telescope does not lessen, but rather increases our awful wonder at the stupendous handiwork of the Divine Builder: the dissecting knife and the microscope do not kill the beauty of the flower, but open to our eager contemplation new wonders that delight and baffle us forever.

But the science of acoustics has done more than simply attempt an explanation of the "why." Among other achievements, it has clearly pointed out the insufficiency of the modern "tempered" scale of keyed instruments, as a complete means of highest musical expression. At best a compromise, it has no claims for continued existence when that of necessity becomes less urgent; and those

orchestral instruments which are keyed, might be so constructed as to admit the modulations of pure intonation, and point the way to the introduction of pure intonation even on the organ. The reverend author urges strongly the propriety of such a change: "It is because music sung and played in pure intonation is of such excellence that it should receive more attention than is ordinarily given it. There are, it is true, those who think that the duodecimal division of the octave is quite sufficient for all purposes of melody and harmony, and that nothing better can be had, and who accordingly regard all who favor a change as unreasonable innovators. But it must be admitted by all who have examined the subject that our present musical system is far from perfect. No one, I take it, will refuse to encourage pure intonation, where, as in vocal and stringed harmony, it can be secured as readily as intonation that is confessedly faulty and unnatural" (p. 432). Equally urgent in this matter are Blaserna and Ellis. Says the former: "The wish may then be expressed that there may be a new and truthful era at hand for music, in which we may abandon the temperate scale and return to the exact scale, and in which a more satisfactory solution of the great difficulties of musical execution will be found than that furnished by the temperate scale, which, simple though it may be, is too rude." Professor Zahm quotes Mr. Ellis in support of the plea: "At any rate, just intonation, even upon a large scale, is immediately possible. And if I long for its adoption in the interests of the listener, still more do I long for it in the interests of the composer" (p. 434).

Another peculiar result of the investigations of the acoustician has been the probable vindication of the Pythagorean scale as a fit instrument of melody. We say "probable;" for while experiments have demonstrated that virtuosi in playing the violin, when not accompanied by keyed instruments such as the piano, naturally play in pure intonation as opposed to the *tempered* scale, the experiments of Cornue and Mercadier give indications that the pythagorean is the scale naturally adopted. Father Zahm had the good fortune of employing the services of the virtuoso Remenyi—the former using a harmonium tuned in just intonation, and the latter a violin. The results achieved, like those obtained by Helmholtz and the master-violinist Joachim, and by Delezenne, showed that equal temperament is not the natural scale of melody. We have here a suggestion that should commend itself to the student of plain chant, namely, that the magnificent choral-song of the Church, not only needs no organ to enhance its beauty, but rather tolerates its use with many a

musical protest. For the tempered scale does many a violence to the pythagorean intervals which furnish the tone-material of plain chant. With equal zeal, but for different reasons, can the disciples of chant join those of modern music in a vigorous warfare on the unmusical instruments which the necessities of mechanicians and performers have given to the world.

More than a word of thanks is due to the reverend author for the careful, painstaking researches which have made his work a real contribution to the history, as well as to the science of acoustics. It is only the original investigator, who does not take his facts at second-hand, but looks to first sources, that can give credit impartially where it is due. With greatest satisfaction we note constant references throughout the extensive volume of Father Zahm to the successful explorations in the field of sound made by the great Père Mersenne—musician, physicist, mathematician, verily *savant*—whose researches have contributed so materially to place the science of sound on a firm basis of physical fact. "The first one to investigate thoroughly the cause of pitch, and the first to determine the pitch of a known musical note, was the illustrious French ecclesiastic, Father Mersenne, of the order of Minims. Père Mersenne, as he is usually known, is justly called the Father of Acoustics. He did for the science of musical sounds what Galileo did for mechanics, and what Copernicus and Kepler achieved for astronomy. He put it on a solid scientific basis, and by the number and variety of his experiments, in almost every department of acoustics, he made the way easy for subsequent investigators. Besides being an excellent musician, he was one of the most eminent mathematicians of an age of great mathematicians. He was the intimate friend and correspondent of Descartes, and was the real founder of the French Academy of Sciences. He translated and made known in France the works of Galileo, and made many discoveries in mathematics and physics. But the greatest monument of his genius is his work on sound and music, the first edition of which appeared in French in 1636, and is called 'Harmonie Universelle.' . . . In this admirable but little known work, the learned author gives evidence, on nearly every page, of his skill as a clever and industrious experimenter and profound thinker. Indeed, many of the laws governing sonorous vibrations are to-day given in almost the same language in which he first formulated them." We have quoted this extensive notice of Père Mersenne *verbatim* from Father Zahm, because it presents to us so admirably the

claims of the great *savant* on the gratitude of the modern scientist. And yet to most students of science, he is little more than a name —if, indeed, he find that recognition even in many scientific circles. It is a gratifying thing to see such a name and such a personality brought out of the obscurity of the centuries, and placed on a commanding eminence. This Father Zahm has been at pains to do, and to do successfully. In countless places in "Sound and Music," his name and his labors receive heartiest and justest recognition.

Whilst we must compliment the reverend author on his valuable contribution to the literature of science, we cannot refrain from tendering to the publishers our sincerest congratulations on the elegant dress in which they have presented the author's work. The typography is large and clear; the illustrations spread in endless profusion throughout the work, are the best we have seen in any work on Physics; the paper is excellent, the binding strong and handsome. We cannot recollect having seen any work of its general character exhibiting such a faultless elegance in style and finish.

H. T. H.

SIDE-SWITCHES OF THE SHORT LINE. Jointly by Rev. J. W. Dean Book and Rev. Thos. Jefferson Jenkins. Published by the Authors, 1892.—Cannelton, Ind., and St. Lawrence, Ky.

There appeared, not long ago, a little book in paper covers entitled "Short Line." It was a familiar exposition of Catholic doctrine in form of a dialect. The manner and style of this publication seemed to have struck a popular vein, for it quickly reached an eighth edition. The author appears to have from the outset contemplated a series of similar works, and in the present volume of 135 pages 32mo we have "Side-Switches—second book of the Short-Line Series." This, however, is the joint work of Fathers Book and Jenkins, the latter already known as a clever defender of Christian schools.

The "Side Switches" aims principally at giving a practical view of the accessories which lead up to and belong to the true Church of Christ. Before being put *au courant* with these, however, we are made acquainted with some branch-roads on which men looking for the truth often lose their time and cannot reach the proper destination unless they switch off into the Short Line. On these Branch-roads we are introduced to a Lutheran pastor, a Methodist brother,

an Episcopal archdeacon, a Presbyterian minister, and a Baptist exhorter. They talk quite amicably with the Reverend Father, setting forth their respective claims to represent the correct road to heaven, but he, with perfect good humor, soon brings them to the ends of their wits, and leaves them to reflect about the consequences of their disagreement in fundamental doctrines which each refers to the Bible.

In the second part we meet a rather mixed but, on the whole, serious group of inquirers at the residence of the Father. They have had some intimation of the manner in which the ministers came to grief, and whilst the present company are agreed that they ought to take no stock in the Branch-roads if they want to get to heaven in good time, they feel somewhat nettled about the exclusive assumption of the priest, who quietly advertises his road as the only direct route. They come to make objection to the Catholic Church on sundry grounds. Thomas, who has had some talks with the Father on previous occasions, brings with him a Mr. O. T. Bee, a Ritualist, Lady Wilde Ruskin, an uncommercial traveler and a professor. These begin to query, and after many a pleasant rejoinder from the priest, they end by following him out to take a look at the church, outside and in, during the course of which promenade he manages to instruct them about the principal rites of the Catholic service which are suggested by the locality and the symbolism of the sacred edifice.

The last chapter, or booklet, as it is called, has a still more practical side. As the company leaves the church the conversation turns upon the social aspect of the Catholic religion. Our uncommercial traveler is not quite ready to become a Romanist. What is the value of the Catholic religion in dollars and cents is an important question with the Yankee, who, though he wants to save his soul, has only one avocation, in which perforce he must do it if it can be done. The Father shows what a valuable factor, from a material point of view, the Catholic Church is to a community such as that represented by the United States ; how it promotes every class of industry and order, and thus secures prosperity and peace to the nation. This part of the book is aptly entitled, "Value of the Church in Dollars and Cents."

We believe this little work can do much good, especially among our young people who naturally take to the presentation of truth in this or kindred forms. In reading-circles it might be used with advantage, several persons taking the parts previously prepared

and investing the instruction with something of dramatic interest. The attractiveness of the book, and hence its usefulness, might be improved, it seems to us, by an edition in better or rather larger type.

Let us add, what is of importance in works of this kind, that the "Side-Switches," whilst written in a pleasant style, approaches nowhere that irreverent flippancy, very close to vulgarity, which so frequently confronts us, for instance, in Catholic (?) newspapers, whose editors pass off their irreverence for breeziness and advance.

THE MANNA OF THE SOUL. Meditations for every day of the year. By Father Paul Segneri. Second Edition. In two volumes.—New York, Cincinnati, Chicago: Benziger Bros. 1892.

This new edition of a favorite meditation book has the advantage over the original (Burns & Oates, London) that it is less bulky, the four volumes having been reduced to two, printed in somewhat smaller but not disagreeable type. The editor has moreover added the Scripture sources of the texts found at the beginning of each meditation, whereas in the former edition they were given only in the Index.

Fr. Segneri's Meditations are so well known as to dispense us from commenting upon a new edition of them, but in regard to translations made for practical use, we have to repeat what we have said on more than one occasion, namely that it is a fault to adhere to the expression of the original at the sacrifice of good style or truth of application so far as the persons for whose benefit the translations are made may be concerned. Thus, to take an example at random, in the meditation on the "Works of Darkness," the English reader is to consider the favors of God in placing him "not in the midst of darkness of the Gentile world, or of Jews and heretics, *but in a Catholic country*." (Feb. 10.) This applies of course to Italy, but it is untrue in regard to English readers. This method of literal translation may be necessary in some cases where there is question of texts, or even in works republished as purely literary monuments, but it is neither to the purpose in devotional books or such as contain practical directions in any line, nor does it show any real regard for the author as might be argued, for surely the writer, who meant to make his works above all things practically useful would be the last to object to any slight alteration or omission of expres-

sions which when translated lose their sense or application. Moreover in ascetical or religious books such literalness has a tendency to make the prayer and meditations unreal.

But it is in no wise our purpose to score a criticism against Fr. Segneri's translator. The fault here pointed out is a common one in works of the kind and in the present instance there is less reason to complain when we regard the general excellence of the book which is of the highest order of meditations for practical use.

MT. REV'D JOHN HUGHES, FIRST ARCHBISHOP OF NEW YORK. ("Makers of America.") By Rev. Henry A. Brann, D.D. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co. 1892.

Hassard's life of Archbishop Hughes fills an important part in the history of Catholicity in the States during the latter half of the present century; but it is not calculated to produce the good effect of this less pretentious volume, which will be more widely read by both Catholics and non-Catholics.

Archbishop Hughes was emphatically a self-made man, and as such became a representative American. Every line of his biography testifies to his whole-souled allegiance to his adopted country—an allegiance which was chastened from touch of sordid and self-interested motives by the sanctifying influence of the Catholic religion. It is needless to enter into the contents of the book or to pass judgment on its literary worth. The names of the writer and publisher vouch for both, and we heartily recommend the reading of this volume as one in the series of "Makers of America," which eminently tends to elevate and foster practical aspirations toward consolidating our new nation and bringing credit upon our holy religion. *Deo et patriae.*

A FRENCH READER. By Rev. Alphonse Dufour, S.J., Professor of French and Literature at Georgetown University.—Boston: Published by Ginn & Co. 1892.

This compilation is intended as a companion to the author's French Grammar. The selections, whilst offering material for the illustration of a gradual advance in the knowledge of grammatical and syntactical forms, have the further purpose of familiarizing the pupil with a comprehensive view of what is best in French literature. This is done in a conscientious and clever manner, for the author, with a full realization of the worth of true education, has

chosen not only from the best sources, but has found his way to utilize to good purpose those gems of beautiful diction which came from men whose love of the true was not equal to their knowledge and appreciation of it, and whose lives belied the aspirations of their genius which they sometimes used to foul purpose. Where passages are given from a beautiful writer unworthy of indiscriminate admiration, Mr. Dufour warns his pupil by a judicious note of introduction to the specimens, always irreproachable, which he gives of him. Teachers need have no apprehension that the moral instincts of their pupils will suffer in the use of this reader, which is more than can be said of those that are commonly used under the sanction of the French Academy.

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DIE GROSSEN WELTRAETHSEL. Philosophie der Natur. Von Tilman Pesch, S.J. Zweite. verbessrte Auflage. Zwei Bde. Freiburg im Br., 1892.—B. Herder, St. Louis, Mo. Pr. 6.50.

DIE APOSTELGESCHICHTE uebersetzt und erklärt von Dr. Joseph Felten.—Freiburg im Br., 1892. B. Herder, St. Louis, Mo. Pr. 3.00.